American University Law Review
Volume 66

Issue 6

Article 6

2017

It's Time to Stop Punting on College Athletes' Rights: Implications
of Columbia University on the Collective Bargaining Rights of
College Athletes
Lucas Novaes
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Education Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Labor
and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Novaes, Lucas (2017) "It's Time to Stop Punting on College Athletes' Rights: Implications of Columbia
University on the Collective Bargaining Rights of College Athletes," American University Law Review: Vol.
66 : Iss. 6 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol66/iss6/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law
Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

It's Time to Stop Punting on College Athletes' Rights: Implications of Columbia
University on the Collective Bargaining Rights of College Athletes
Abstract
The National Labor Relations Board ruled in Columbia University that student assistants who have a
common law employment relationship with their university are statutory employees under the National
Labor Relations Act, which granted them full bargaining rights and union protection. However, just one
year earlier, the Board decided to not address the question of whether college athletes receiving grant-inaid scholarships should similarly be accorded the protections of the Act as statutory employees.
Importantly, the Board noted that it was well-suited to make that determination in the future.
College athletes have been left in legal limbo as the teams, universities, and athletic conferences they
work for have continued to profit exuberantly while denying them any substantial rights. The increased
commercialization of collegiate sports has paralleled the prohibitive control that athletic conferences and
universities exert over the athletic, social, and academic lives of college athletes. Thus, the Act-designed
to prevent exploitation of labor-is the legal remedy available to college athletes seeking to reclaim their
dignity and achieve equity in bargaining power.
This Comment argues that the Board's decision in Columbia compels a finding that grant-in-aid athletes,
or college athletes, participating in revenue-generating sports at Division I private universities and
colleges are employees under the Act. Specifically, Columbia's statutory and common law test, as well as
the jurisdictional discretion standard, all require a finding that it is legally unsound to continue to denyunder the veil of "amateurism "-college athletes the protections available to them under federal labor law
while conceding that student assistants are deserving of those same protections
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IT'S TIME TO STOP PUNTING ON
COLLEGE ATHLETES' RIGHTS:
IMPLICATIONS OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
ON THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
RIGHTS OF COLLEGE ATHLETES
LucAs NOVAES*

The NationalLabor Relations Board ruled in Columbia University that
student assistantswho have a common law employment relationshipwith their
university are statutory employees under the National Labor Relations Act,
which granted themfull bargainingrights and union protection. However, just
one year earlier, the Board decided to not address the question of whether college

athletes receiving grant-in-aid scholarships should similarly be accorded the
protections of the Act as statutory employees. Importantly, the Board noted that
it was well-suited to make that determination in the future.
College athletes have been left in legal limbo as the teams, universities, and
athletic conferences they work for have continued to profit exuberantly while
denying them any substantial rights. The increased commercialization of
collegiate sports has paralleled the prohibitive control that athletic conferences
and universities exert over the athletic, social, and academic lives of college
athletes. Thus, the Act-designed to prevent exploitation of labor-is the legal
remedy available to college athletes seeking to reclaim their dignity and achieve

equity in bargainingpower.
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sacrifice and dedication and my brother for inspiring me to study the law. I could
not have done it without you all.
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This Comment argues that the Board's decision in Columbia compels a
finding that grant-in-aidathletes, or college athletes, participatingin revenuegeneratingsports at Division I private universities and colleges are employees
underthe Act. Specifically, Columbia'sstatutory and common law test, as well
as the jurisdictionaldiscretion standard, all require a finding that it is legally
unsound to continue to deny-under the veil of "amateurism"-college athletes
the protections available to them underfederal labor law while conceding that
student assistantsare deserving of those same protections.
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"[Elvery Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any
Right to but himself The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands,
we may say, areproperly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that
Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and
jo[ilned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for
others."
-John Locke'
INTRODUCTION

A remarkable feature of American universities is the role that
intercollegiate athletics enjoys in the college experience. Not only do
athletic programs at universities inspire fervent allegiance, but these
programs also generate millions of dollars in profits for their respective
schools and leagues.'
However, while universities financially
compensate numerous student assistants who research or otherwise
work for the university in some capacity,' universities fail to
compensate college athletes for their revenue-producing skills and the

1. JOHN LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
2. See generally Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Emperor's
New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA's Veil of Amateurism; 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 495, 509-27
(2008) (detailing the enormous profits that the National Collegiate Athletes
Association [NCAA] and universities receive directly and indirectly from collegiate
athletics); Nathan McCoy & Kerry Knox, Comment, Flexing Union Muscle-Is It the Right
Game Planfor Revenue GeneratingStudent-Athletes in Their Contestsfor Benefits Reform with
theNCAA ?, 69 TENN. L. REv. 1051, 1058-60 (2002) (showing the NCAA's massive profits
from ticket sales, advertising deals with corporate America, and broadcasting and
television contracts for championship games); 60 Minutes: Where's Ours? College Athletes
Band Together to Insist on a Cut of Profits Madefrom Their SportingEvents (CBS television
broadcast Jan. 6, 2002).
3. For example, Columbia University pays its part-time and work-study students
$15 an hour. Catie Edmondson, Columbia to Pay Student Workers $15 an Hour, COLUMBIA
SPECTATOR (Mar. 30, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://columbiaspectator.com/news/2016/
03/28/columbia-pay-students-workers-15-hour.
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considerable time they spend training, preparing, and competing.'
Although legal scholars have extensively discussed and written about
the status of college athletes on university campuses,' the leading
enforcer of federal labor laws recently decided a case regarding
student assistants that questions the widely held opinion that college
athletes are merely students.
On August 23, 2016, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
"the Board") held in Columbia Universityj that student assistants who
have a common-law employment relationship' with their university are
statutory employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
"the Act"), which granted them full bargaining rights and union
protection.' The Board further held that affording student assistantsgraduate or undergraduate-the right to engage in collective bargaining
would "further the policies of the Act, without engendering any
cognizable, countervailing harm to private higher education." This
decision overruled the Board's previous determination in Brown
University,10 which held that permitting graduate student assistants to
bargain collectively would improperly intrude onto the educational process
and would be inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the Act."
The ruling in Columbia is groundbreaking because, in addition to
overturning Brown, it also abandoned the legal- and policy-based
rationale it proffered just one year earlier in Northwestern University."
4. NCAA rules do not allow payment to student athletes beyond athletic
scholarships, which are generally referred to as "grant-in-aid." See infra note 153 and
accompanying text.
5. See gnerallyJOENOCERA & BEN STRAUSS, INDENTURED: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
REBELLION AGAINST THE NCAA 53-54 (2016) (discussing the paradox of collegiate

sports, where its commercialization has led to both massive profits for the NCAA and
its member institutions and continued institutional exploitation of college athletes);
C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More than Ever, 38 S. TEX. L.
REv. 1081, 1083 (1997) (suggesting that athletes in Division I revenue-generating
sports deserve compensation beyond scholarship and cost of attendance); Michael P.
Cianfichi, Comment, Varsity Blues: Student Athlete Unionization is the Wrong Way Forward
to Reform Collegiate Athletics, 74 MD. L. REV. 583, 596-97 (2015) (arguing that
unionization in the educational setting is a slippery slope that would create negative
unintended consequences).
6. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).
7.

See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, How to Apply the Common Law Control Test

https://www.ssa.gov/
Relationship,
Employer-Employee
Determining an
in
section2l8training/advancedccourse_10.htm#4 (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).
8. Id. at 13. See generallyNational Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012).
9. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 13.
10. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
11. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 12-13.
12. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015).

2017]IT'S TIME To STOP PUNTING ON COLLEGE ATHLETES' RIGHTS

1537

Columbia implicitly undermined Northwestern's holding, which had
discouraged courts from exercising jurisdiction over college athletes
and from recognizing them as employees.'5 The petitioners in
Northwestern, football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships, had
asked the Board to recognize them as employees under the Act." Such
recognition would have afforded them numerous protections under
federal labor laws and would have significantly improved their
bargaining power." When the Regional Director first heard the case,' 6
he ruled that the petitioned-for unit at Northwestern must be accorded
employee status because they met the Board's common law test for
determining who is an employee under the Act.17 Yet upon reviewing
the regional office's decision, the Board overturned the Regional
Director's determination and held that asserting jurisdiction over
college athletes would not promote stability in labor relations and
would not further the policies of the Act." By not exercising
jurisdiction, the Board punted on the specific question of whether
college athletes are employees under the Act but, remarkably, noted
in the opinion that nothing precluded a future determination"9 that
college athletes are employees.o
At stake is the status quo, where college athletes have no substantial
rights as amateur athletes," are subjected to prohibitive control at the
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id.
15. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (listing the triad of
rights accorded to employees under the Act).
16. The National Labor Relations Board is comprised of twenty-six regional offices
that are authorized to serve their respective regions concerning petitions for elections.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Who We Are, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are
(last visited Aug. 30, 2017). See generally NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, The NLRB
Process: Representative Election Process Chart, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrbprocess (last visited Aug. 30, 2017) (illustrating the regional director's role in the
representative election process).
17. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.RB. LEXIS 221, at *67-68 (Mar. 26, 2014).
18. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6-7 (Aug. 17, 2015).
19. Id. at 6.
20. The Act's employee designations give workers the right to: (1) form, join, and
assist labor organizations; (2) bargain collectively through representatives chosen by
the workers; and (3) engage in concerted activities such as picketing and strikes to
advance and protect their interests. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
Moreover, these rights apply even if the employees are not part of a union. NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD,
Employee Rights, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/employee-rights (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).
21. Ben Strauss, 'As a College Athlete, You Really Have No Rights', PoLIco (Mar. 16,
2017),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/congress-ncaa-marchmadness-214918; infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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hands of their coaches, universities, and respective leagues," all the
while enduring some of the most laborious work on college
campuses. The opportunity for college athletes to gain legal status
as employees under federal law-which is likely imminent after
Columbia-would allow college athletes to caucus for their rights and
salvage their dignity. Neither does this issue remain in a vacuum at
the Board level. For example, federal courts have already begun to
chip away at the National Collegiate Athletes Association's (NCAA)
notion of "amateurism": litigation has sparked national dialogue
concerning college athletes' rights regarding the lucrative use of
their own images and whether they are entitled to minimum wages.
The Board's General Counsel and the NCAA itself have also started
to revise their guidelines and policies concerning college athletes.
This Comment argues that the Board's rationale in the 2015
Northwestern decision-which cautioned exercising jurisdiction over
college athletes and thereby recognizing them as employees2'ironically relied on the same flawed logic 27 that the Board criticized in
its 2016 Columbia decision overturning Brown. The Board in Columbia
claimed that Brown created ill-conceived policy arguments and
purported to understand what is best for American intercollegiate
sports without any empirical evidence to support such a claim.2 ' This
Comment argues that the Board's decision in Columbia should be
applied to Northwestern, compelling a finding that grant-in-aid athletes,
or college athletes,' at Division I schools of the NCAA are employees
22. See infra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Section I.D.2(a).
25. See infra Sections I.D.2(b)-(c).
26. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6 (Aug. 17, 2015).
27. See infra notes 279-87 and accompanying text (applying Columbia's critique of
Brown to the Board's decision in Northwestern to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over
college athletes).
28. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 12 (Aug. 23, 2016) (Liebman &Walsh,
Members, dissenting) (quoting Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 497 (2004)) (noting
that the majority's decision was not based on policy concerns derived from the Act,
but rather, reflected "an abstract view about what is best for American higher
education-a subject far removed from the Board's expertise").
29. This Comment uses the term "college athlete" instead of "student-athlete," due
to the latter's insidious origination and almost pejorative place in this discussion. See
Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The
College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REv. 71, 73-75 (2006) (highlighting the origin
of the term "student-athlete" as NCAA propaganda aiming to obscure the reality that
university athletes are employees); see also Mary Grace Miller, Comment, TheNCAA and
the Student-Athlete: Reform Is on the Horizon, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 1141, 1142 (2012) ("The
term 'student-athlete' was designed by the NCAA to preserve the amateur ideal ...
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under the Act. Specifically, this Comment's thesis is limited in
application only to athletes participating in college athletics in
revenue-generating sports."0
Section L.A provides an overview of the role that the Board plays in
designating an "employee" under the Act and the significance of that
determination for employees. Section I.B outlines the major Board
cases that have expanded the "employee" designation in the private
university context and that have culminated in Northwestern and
Columbia. Next, Section I.C explains the Board's statutory and
common law test in Columbia for determining whether an employment
relationship exists and the standard for exercising jurisdiction over a
particular bargaining unit. Furthermore, Section I.D explores the
status of collegiate football in the twenty-first century by looking to the
nature and organization of the NCAA and an emerging national trend
expanding college athletes' rights as employees and professionals.
Sections II.A-B of this Comment applies the Board's statutory and
common law test in Columbia for determining who is an employee
under the Act to the case of college athletes. Section II.C applies the
jurisdictional discretion standard developed in Columbia to argue that
the Board was mistakenly cautious in refraining from exercising
jurisdiction in Northwestern. Part III of this Comment concludes that
under Columbia, college athletes in revenue-generating sports at private,
Division I NCAA universities and colleges are employees under the Act
and that the Board can and should exertjurisdiction over this question.

&

[and] to provide an easy defense against workers' compensation claims."); Justin C.
Vine, Note, Leveling the PlayingField: Student Athletes Are Employees of Their University, 12
CARbOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICSJ. 235, 240 (2013) (explaining that the NCAA created
the term "student athlete" to disguise any perceived employment relationship between
athletes and universities that could cause legal consequences).
30. Most college athletics teams generate little revenue or operate at a loss; they
are subsidized by their universities' revenue-generating sports, which are generally
men's basketball and football. See Patrick Rishe, College FootballProfiteeringa Necessary
Evil for Financing Athletics, Long-Term Branding, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2011, 2:10 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2011/09/21/college-football-profiteering-anecessary-evil-for-financing-athletics-long-term-branding/#7cdae7dl52fd
(describing
how revenue-generating sports often bear the financial brunt of non-revenuegenerating sports). Therefore, universities are likely to financially exploit only those
college athletes competing in revenue-generating sports.
See McCormick
McCormick, supranote 29, at 97-98 (defining "revenue-generating sports" as Division
I football and men's basketball).
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BACKGROUND

The Role of the NationalLaborRelations Board Under the National
LaborRelations Act

The Act, also known as the Wagner Act, provides the legal structure
governing labor relations in the United States." It also provides
employees with bargaining rights to preserve industrial peace and
prevent employer exploitation of labor." In aiming to achieve equality
of bargaining power, the Act "safeguards commerce from the harm
caused by labor disputes"" and seeks to mitigate concerns that include
the amount of compensation, the number of working hours in a given
day or week, and the general health and safety of employees."
However, the Act is more than just a tool for preventing the disruption
of labor by labor-management disputes." In granting a triad of rights
to employees, 36 the Act was, as Senator Wagner described, an affirmative
vehicle for economic and social progress." Truly, Congress designed the Act
to shield workers from employers who exploit them by threatening
discharge as a self-help tool in combating organizing efforts."
31. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012).
32. See § 151 (discussing various findings and policy arguments under the Act and
explaining how unequal bargaining power between employers and employees will
likely obstruct the flow of commerce).
33. Seattle Opera Ass'n v. Am. Guild Musical Artists, 331 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1074
(2000) (internal citation omitted).
34. See C~sar F. Rosado Marzin & Alex Tillett-Saks, Work, Study, Oganize!: Why the
Northwestern University FootballPlayers are Employees Under the National LaborRelations Act,
32 HoFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301, 319 (2015) (noting that the concerns driving college
athletes toward unionization are precisely the kinds of issues the Act intended to
resolve through collective bargaining).
35.

See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw: THE BOARD, THE CouRTs, AND THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS Acr 13 (John E. Higgins, Jr., et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw] (arguing that the advent of federal labor law and the Act
was a result of the judiciary's unsuccessful attempt to regulate labor disputes and a
reflection of Congress's desire to end the judiciary's selective suppression of organized
labor's activities).
36. A unit accorded the "employee" designation will have the right to (1) form,
join, and assist labor organizations; (2) bargain collectively through representatives;
and (3) engage in concerted activities such as picketing, boycotts, and strikes. National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
37. 79 CONG. REc. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner) ("Caught in the labyrinth
of modem industrialism and dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise, [the employee] can
attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation with [other employees].").
38. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 35, at 29-30. The Act was also
conspicuously one-sided, providing no corresponding protections against union
action. Id. (noting that several "equalizing" amendments were offered to cure the
Act's perceived slant in favor of organized labor-although none passed).
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To administer and enforce the Act," Congress created the Board, a
federal administrative agency established to (1) supervise and conduct
representative elections and (2) adjudicate allegations of unfair labor
practices.4 o In supervising elections, the Board determines the
appropriate "bargaining units," or groups of employees qualified to
vote in union representation elections, which establishes the union
that will represent the employees." However, under the Act, unions
never impose collective bargaining on employees; instead, the Act
simply affords the members of the unit the autonomy to decide
whether to seek union representation based on majority support."
Thus, the Act expands employees' freedom to play a role in their
employment relationship while recognizing that satisfied employees
may choose not to bargain with their employers.
Pursuant to its power to determine an appropriate bargaining unit,
the Board must decide whether an employment relationship exists
and, more importantly, who it considers an "employee."13 However,
39. The Board has jurisdiction over most private sector employers, but the Act
explicitly excludes persons employed by the federal, state, or local government. 29
U.S.C. § 152(2); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Jurisdictional Standards,
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/jurisdictional-standards (last visited Aug. 30,
2017). The Board is also statutorily authorized to determine the scope of bargainingthe issues that are subject to negotiation under federal labor laws-which must include
all issues relating to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employments. 29
U.S.C.

§

159(a); see also MATrHEWJ. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION 487

(3d ed. 2013) ("Wages include pay, fringe benefits, and bonus payments; hours encompass
time spent on the job; and working conditions cover factors influencing the work
environment, such as work rules, seniority, and safety."); GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF
SPORTS LAw 527 exhibit 11.1 (4th ed. 2010) (illustrating the mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining once an employment relationship has been determined to exist).
40. WONG, supra note 39, at 523; see also supranote 16.
41. A "bargaining unit" is a group of two or more employees represented by a
single labor union with a shared, identifiable community interest that allows
employees to be grouped together for collective bargaining purposes. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act (1997),
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node3024/basicguide.pdf. Under § 159(b) of the Act, the Board has discretion to
determine what an appropriate unit is for such purposes: "to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b); see aso MITTEN ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 487.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); see also Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 2 n.8 (Aug.
23, 2016).
43. Determining whether an employee-employer relationship exists is a statutory
pre-requisite to protection under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 151. The Supreme Court has
made clear that Congress authorized the Board to define the term "employee." See
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that question has vexed the Board for decades and is subject to much
scholarly scrutiny and debate because the Act fails to meaningfully
define "employee" or "employer"; instead, it defines one by reference
to the other. 4 Thus, the Board looks to common law doctrines to
supplement the statutory meaning of the term "employee" and to
incorporate new bargaining units within the fold of the Act's protections.
B.

The Meaning of "Employee"in the Private University Setting

The Board has been inconsistent in defining "employee" since
initially asserting jurisdiction over private universities, often reversing
its previous determinations within a short span of time.' This
inconsistency has led to the Board applying different common law
doctrines for determining the meaning of "employee" under the Act
in the private university setting.
Section I.B.1 discusses the various Board decisions that have ruled
on the statutory meaning of "employee" in the private university setting
and how the Board's common law test has evolved over the years.
Section I.B.2 then analyzes the Northwestern decision, as well as the role
thatjurisdictional discretion plays in the Board's determination of who
is an "employee" under the Act.

NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 89 (1995) (holding that rights
guaranteed by the Act belong only to workers who qualify as "employees" under the
Act); see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (quoting NLRB v. Hearst
Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944)) (justifying the Board's considerable deference
in constructing the term "employee" by explaining that the task of defining
"employee" has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to
administer the Act), superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14), as recognized inPatel v.
Sumani Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (N.D. Ala. 1987).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) ("The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an
agent of an employer, directly or indirectly. . . ."); id. § 152(3) ("The term 'employee'
shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer. . . ."). Although the Act only governs private enterprises, its interpretation
is highly' influential because numerous state statutes governing the employment
relationship among public employers and employees are specifically modeled after the
Act and draw on the Board's interpretations. SeeMcCormick & McCormick, supra note
29, at 90 (" [T]he statutory language itself fails to distinguish the salient characteristics of
either employer or employee from other classes of entities or persons. . . .").
45. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 3-5 (citing New York Univ., 332 N.L.RB.
1205, 1205-06 (2000)) (noting that the Board has relied on the "breadth of the statutory
language, the lack of any statutory exclusion[s] ... [and the] common-law agency doctrine"
when determining whether a bargaining unit is properly accorded employee status).
46. See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B.
329 (1970).

2017]IT'S TIME To STOP PUNTING ON COLLEGE ATFLETES' RIGHTS 1543

1.

Student assistants and theirpath to employee status
The Board's reluctance to exercise jurisdiction over college athletes
in Northwestern surprised many because the Board has exercised
jurisdiction over private universities in some fashion for close to fortysix years.
During those years, it has grappled with the decision to
accord the Act's protections to various categories of employees in the
university context, relying on numerous different tests to determine
who is an "employee." For example, within two years of asserting
jurisdiction over private universities for the first time in 1970," the
Board took up the question of how to categorize graduate assistants in
Adelphi University.' In that case, the Board decided to exclude
graduate assistants from a bargaining unit of university faculty
members because the graduate assistants did not share a "community
of interest" with the faculty.' Similarly, in Leland Stanford Junior
University," the Board concluded that university research assistants
were not statutory employees because they were "primarily students,"
and as such, their tasks were not controlled by the universities in a
manner that is indicative of an employment relationship."
However, since those decisions in the 1970s, the Board has
cautiously expanded the category of workers in private universities who

&

&

47. See Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 426 n.7 (1951), overruled by Cornell Univ.,
183 N.L.R.B. at 330-31 (holding that it would best effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction over nonprofit, private educational institutions). Additionally,
although the expansion of the employee designation has not been confined to the
private university context, that context is most germane to this analysis. See Town
Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 98 (holding that the Board's construction of the term
"employee" to include paid union organizers employed by a company was lawful); see
also Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891 (deferring to the Board's determination that
undocumented aliens are employees under the Act); NLRB v. Hendricks Cty. Rural
Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 189-90 (1981) (affirming the Board's
treatment of confidential employees as "employees" under the Act).
48. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.RB. 329 (1970). See generally Arthur P. Menard
Nicholas DiGiovanni, Jr., NLRB Jurisdiction over Colleges and Universities: A Plea for
Rulemaking, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 599, 599 (1975) (discussing the advent of faculty
unionism in the Board's 1970 decision to exercise jurisdiction over institutions of
higher learning).
49. 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
50. Id. at 640 (asserting that although the 125 graduate students performed some
faculty-related functions, they "[did] not share a sufficient community of interest with
the regular faculty to warrant their inclusion in the [bargaining] unit").
51. 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
52. Id. at 623. The Board rejected the notion that the eighty-three research
assistants were employees due to receiving grants and stipends because that was
compensation to acquire their degrees, rather than payment for specific skills or tasks
performed. Id. at 621, 623.
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are eligible for protection under the Act.5 3 The Board first held that

graduate student assistants were statutory employees under the Act in
New York University.' In that case, the Board overruled the "primarily
students" analysis 5 5 that some of its prior decisions had relied on and
instead followed the three principles the Board described in Boston
Medical Center" for determining whether an employment relationship
exists. These three principles are (1) the broadness of the statutory
language; (2) the absence of any statutory exclusion for students; and
(3) the common law agency doctrine of the master-servant
relationship.57 Relying on these principles, the New York Board found
that student assistants indubitably fell within that common law
doctrine and pronounced that it would not "deprive workers who are
compensated by, and under the control of, a statutory employer of
their fundamental statutory rights to organize and bargain with their
employer, simply because they are also students.""

53. The expansion of collective bargaining in private universities began with
Bradford College, where the Board held that faculty members were professional
employees of the university and not managerial employees; thus, the faculty members
were considered employees under the Board's precedent. Bradford Coll., 261
N.L.R.B. 565, 567 (1982). In spite of the absence of an explicit statutory exception,
the Board concluded that managerial employees are not covered by the Act because
Congress implied their exclusion. The Board believed it would destroy the traditional
distinction between labor and management to have non-managerial employees in the
same "camps" as managers, who are presumed to be on the side of the employer.
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (quoting Packard Motor Car
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494-95 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Similarly, the
Board ruled in Boston Medical Centerthat house staff at a university teaching hospitalinterns, residents, and clinical fellows-were employees under the Act. Bos. Med. Ctr.
Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999). In that case, the Board voiced that the expansion
of the Act's protections to house staff would advance the policy goals of the Act. Id.
(holding that students came within the meaning of "employee" as defined in the Act
because the exclusions listed in the statute were limited and narrow).
54. 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000), overruled by Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
55. The "primarily student" analysis focuses on whether a particular group of
students perform enough faculty-related tasks to share a sufficient community of
interest with the regular faculty so as their inclusion in a bargaining unit for employee
status is appropriate. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972).
56. 330 N.L.RB. 152 (1999).
57. See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205-06 (2000) (listing the three
principles that guided the Boston Medical Centerdecision and explaining that under the
common law agency doctrine of the master-servant relationship, the Board analyzes
whether the purported employee performed services under the control and direction
of the employer in exchange for compensation).
58. Id. at 1209.
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However, the Board overruled the New York decision just a few years
later in Brown University." In Brown, the Board retreated from
expanding the Act's protections in the university context and
reinstated the "primarily students" analysis that New York had
discarded. Accordingly, Brown held that graduate student assistants
failed to meet a prerequisite to statutory coverage because they had a
"primarily educational" relationship with the university and Congress
designed the Act to protect only economic relationships."o In relying
on the "primarily student" test explicitly overruled in previous
decisions," the Board further held that collective bargaining was illsuited for educational decision making and would be detrimental to
labor and educational policies."
Nevertheless, Brown's "woefully out of touch" rationale and narrow
reading of the statutory language would not remain precedential." In
yet another twist of the Board's definition of "employee" in the
university setting, on August 23, 2016, the Board in Columbia boldly
rejected Brown's characterization of the harmful effects of collective
bargaining in the educational context and explicitly overruled it." In
that case, Columbia University asserted that its student assistants were
not common law employees because, as externally funded research
assistants, they lacked an economic relationship with the university and
could not be employees of a university under the Board's precedent.
The Board, rejecting the university's argument, held that "[w]here
student assistants have an employment relationship with their

59. 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
60. Id. at 489.
61. See Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 4 (Aug. 23, 2016) (criticizing the
Board's decision in Brown for overlooking the fact that graduate-student employment
in the educational context was adaptable to collective bargaining, as evinced by
experience at public-sector universities and at New York University). Additionally,
there are more than thirty collective bargaining units representing more than 65,000
graduate students across the country in mostly public universities. Danielle DouglasGabriel, Are They Students? Or Are They Employees? NLRB Rules that They Are Employees,
WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2016/08/23/are-they-students-or-are-they-employees-nlrb-rules-thatgraduate-students-are-employees/.
62. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 489.
63. Id. at 493 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
64. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 1.
65. Id. at 16. Columbia relied on the decision in Leland Stanford, which held that
externally funded research assistants were "primarily students" who lacked an
economic relationship with the university and thus could not be common law
employees because they worked independently for their own benefit and the university
ultimately did not control them. Id. at 17.
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university under the common law test-which they do here-this
relationship is sufficient to establish that the student assistant is
a[n] ...

employee for all statutory purposes."'

The decision in Columbiawas not merely a rehashing of the Board's
original determination that graduate student assistants were
employees in New York; rather, it went further than the Board ever had.
Unlike New York, which determined that only graduate students were
employees,' 7 the successful bargaining unit in Columbia included all
student employees who provided instructional or research services to
the university, including undergraduate students.' More importantly,
the Columbia decision reaffirmed the dynamic flexibility of the Act'
and proclaimed that the policy aims of the Act are furthered by
expanding its protections to workers who meet the Board's common
law test.7 o Columbiawas thus an unequivocal endorsement of collective

bargaining in the university context.
2. Northwestern: College athletes as employees and the role of
jurisdictionaldiscretion
One year prior to the Board's decision in Columbia, the Board issued
its opinion in Northwestern, in which it refused to determine on
jurisdictional grounds whether football players receiving grant-in-aid
scholarships at Northwestern University were employees under the
Act.71 The issue before the Board, however, was novel: it had never
66. Id. at 4. While arguing in front of the Regional Director, the university
conceded that if the Board were to apply the common law test for employment,
student assistants must be considered employees under the Act. Id. at 15. It retracted
this position on appeal. Id.
67. See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1221 (2000) (referring collectively to
the petitioned-for and certified bargaining unit comprised of graduate student
assistants as "graduate assistants" under the Act).
68. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 1 n.1 (defining the bargaining unit as
"all students ... including graduate and undergraduate Teaching Assistants ... [and]
Additionally, all of the petitioned-for student assistant
Research Assistants").
classifications were found to be an appropriate unit and thus, statutory employees. Id.
at 13.
69. Id. at 9 (highlighting the "historic flexibility of collective bargaining as a
practice and its viability at public universities" in countering the argument that
collective bargaining will harm the educational process).
70. See id. at 12 n.91 ("[I] t is important to note the policy judgment embodied in
[It] is designed to lessen conflict . .. and reflects the judgment of
the Act . . ..
Congress that collective bargaining ... is a right to be accorded broadly and across
many industries.").
71. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 1 (Aug. 17, 2015). Courts have
historically been divided on this general question. See MrrrEN ET AL., Supra note 39, at
139. However, some courts have recognized college athletes as employees. See, e.g.,
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before asserted jurisdiction over college athletes nor received a
petition for representation that sought a bargaining unit comprised of
a single college team.'2 Even more, the Board was reviewing a Regional
Director's bold determination that grant-in-aid scholarship players for
the employer's football team were "employees" under the Act.7 1
Although the Board ultimately failed to resolve the question
presented,
the Regional Director's decision was the first time in
history that an opinion directed an election for representation of
college athletes under the Act.75
The Regional Director's opinion analyzed whether college athletes
were employees under Brown's economic relationship test, which has

Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 466 (1963) (holding that
a deceased college athlete had an employment relationship with the university; thus,
a worker's compensation claim could be brought to recover for his death), superseded
by statute, Cal. Lab. Code § 3352(k) (West 2017), as recognized in Shepard v. Loyola
Marymount Univ., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Univ. of Denver v.
Ne'meth, 257 P.2d 423, 430 (Colo. 1953) (finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between a college athlete and the university where he played
football).
72. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.RB. No. 167, at 3. But see Big East Conference, 282
N.L.R.B. 335, 342 (1986) (asserting jurisdiction over an NCAA Division I Athletics
Conference). Additionally, the Board has asserted jurisdiction in other contexts
involving college athletics. See Providence Coll., 340 N.L.R.B. 966, 971-72 (2003)
(bargaining unit consisted of employees who performed functions in support of
college events); Univ. of Bridgeport, 229 N.L.RB. 1074, 1075 (1977) (bargaining unit
included athletic coaches).
73. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.RB. LEXIS 221, at *68 (Mar. 26, 2014).
74. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 3 (declining to determine
whether college athletes are employees under the Act for fear that asserting
jurisdiction in the case would fail to promote the policies of the Act).
75. See Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *68-69 (directing an
immediate election of all football players receiving football grant-in-aid scholarship
that had not exhausted their playing eligibility to determine if they wanted to be
represented by a union). See generally Lori K Mans &J. Evan Gibbs, Student Athletes as
Employees?,
89
FIA.
BAR
J.
4
(Apr.
2015),
https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal0l.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/71147e84b9e8876785257el400664ec510penDocu
ment (arguing that the Regional Director's decision would have "potentially sweeping"
impact on the viability of athletic programs due to broad, costly protections that would
be afforded to college athletes under other federal labor laws); Brennan W. Bolt,
March Madness? NLRB RegionalDirectorFinds Northwestern'sFootballPlayers Are Employees
Under
the
NLRA,
LAB.
REL.
TODAY
(Mar.
26,
2014),
http://www.laborrelationstoday.com/2014/03/articles/special-interests/marchmadness-nlrb-regional-director-finds-northwestems-football-players-are-employeesunder-the-nlra (characterizing the Regional Director's decision as one "that could
forever change collegiate sports as we know it").
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now been overruled, 7 and its right to control test, which is still valid
and remains the traditional common law agency test.77 The right to

control test, further elucidated in Columbia, is simply whether (1) the
employee works for a statutory employer in return for financial or other
compensation and (2) whether the statutory employer has the control or
right to control the person in the details of how the work is performed.78
The first element of the right to control test required the Regional
Director to examine the compensation football players received for
their athletic performance and the benefits conferred to their
ostensible employer, the university.79 The record demonstrated that
the university's football program generated revenues of $235 million
between 2003 and 2012 through its participation in the NCAA Division
I and Big Ten Conference.80 That revenue was generated through
ticket sales, television broadcast contracts, merchandise sales, and
licensing agreements."1 Concluding that the university derived an
"economic benefit" from the relationship, the Director then examined
whether the scholarships were compensation for athletic services."
Although the football players did not receive a physical paycheck, the
Regional Director found that irrelevant because each individual
scholarship totaled as much as $76,000 per calendar year."3
Emphasizing that athletes were "sought out, recruited, and ultimately
granted scholarships because of their athletic prowess on the football

76. Although the Act is designed to cover an economic relationship, such as an
employment relationship, the Brown decision's "fundamental error" was failing to
frame the issue of statutory coverage in terms of the existence of an employment
relationship; but rather, as it did, framing the issue as whether some other relationship
between the employee and the employer is the primary one, "a standard neither
derived from the statutory text. . . nor from the fundamental policy of the Act."
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 5 (Aug. 23, 2016). The threshold necessary
to the "economic" dimension in an employment relationship is compensation. Id. at
6.
77. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *53-54.
78. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 15 n.100 (quoting Seattle Opera v.
NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY§ 2(2)
(AM. LAw INST. 1958).
79. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.RB. LEXIS 221, at *40-41.
80. Id. at 41.
81. Id. Although Universities will often use the revenue generated from certain
collegiate sports to subsidize non-revenue-generating sports, the Regional Director
underscored that Northwestern was allowed to utilize the economic benefit provided
by the services of the football players in any manner it chose. Id. at *38, *41.
82. Id. at *41-42.
83. Id. at *42.
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field," the Regional Director concluded that the grant-in-aid
scholarships were clearly "compensation."84
Next,. the Regional Director considered the second element for
determining if an employment relationship existed: whether the
university had control over the details of the football players' work."
The university provided daily itineraries delineating how players
should spend every hour of their day during the pre-season and
demanded that players allot forty to fifty hours per week on football
activities during the regular season; moreover, university staff
regulated the football players' private lives prohibitively."
The
university's relentless control even permeated the players' academic
lives. 7 The Director concluded that players receiving scholarships
were under "strict and exacting control by their [e]mployer
throughout the entire year,"' ultimately finding that the grant-in-aid
scholarship players were employees under the Act.'
Needless to say, the Director's decision was controversial,"o and the
Board ultimately dismissed the petition and impounded the election,
84. Id. at *41-42. In addition, the fact that the players signed a "tender" serving as
an employment contract and that the scholarships were subject to immediate
cancelation if the player voluntarily withdrew from the team were further evidence
that football scholarships (compensation) were tied to the players' performance
(services). Id. at *42-44.
85. Id. at *45.
86. Id. at *45-.A8 (finding that players have restrictions placed on them and must
obtain permission from coaches or risk termination before: (1) making living
arrangements; (2) applying for outside employment; (3) driving personal vehicles; (4)
traveling off campus; (5) posting on social media; (6) speaking to the media; (7) using
alcohol and drugs; and (8) engaging in gambling). Additionally, the NCAA also exerts
control over college athletes. See infranote 157 and accompanying text (reviewing the
NCAA's restriction on the number of hours college athletes can devote to athletic
activities).
87. See Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *48-49 (discussing how
players would often be unable to select certain courses due to conflict with football
activities); M. Tyler Brown, Comment, College Athletics Internships: The CaseforAcademic
Credit in College Athletics, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 1855, 1866-67 (2014) (explaining how
college athletes regularly miss class to attend games, have tutors complete their
assignments, attend sham classes that lack academic rigor, and reportedly pass classes
they rarely attend).
88. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *45; see also Marzdin & TilletSaks, supra note 34, at 311-12 (emphasizing that few principal-agent relationships are
characterized by such direct control as that of the Northwestern football players'
relationship with Northwestern University).
89. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *68.
90. SeeJon Hyman, Did the NLRB Do More Harm than Good by PermittingTeachingand
Research

Assistants

to

Organize?,

WORKFORCE

(Aug.

31,

http://www.workforce.com/2016/08/31/nlrb-harm-good-permitting-teaching-

2016),
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holding that it "would not effectuate the policies of the Act . .. to assert
jurisdiction over th [e] case."" The Board side-stepped the question of
whether the college athletes were employees by relying on two
overlapping reasons: (1) the nature of sports leagues and (2) the
composition and structure of college football." The Board reasoned
that the control exercised by the NCAA over its member institutions
and their athletes, coupled with the fact that the overwhelming
majority of competitors in the Football Bowl Subdivision ("FBS") are
public colleges and universities outside of the Board's jurisdiction,
made the bargaining unit so unique that asserting jurisdiction would
not promote uniformity and stability to labor relations."
In that conclusion, the Board noted that it was declining to assert
jurisdiction "without deciding whether the scholarship players are
employees [under the Act]."" The Board's cautious dismissal of the
case on jurisdictional grounds left unresolved the question of whether
college athletes could be employees" and went to great lengths to limit
the application of its ruling,' hinting at what a successful petition for
7
according the Act's protections to college athletes might look like.
The Board concluded that it was completely justified in declining to

research-assistants-organize (arguing that the decision will ironically harm the students
it aims to protect); Terry Briscoe & Ed Piper, Northwestern University FoothallPlayersCan't
Vote for Union Representation . .. But It's Not aver Until It'sover, WORLD OF EMP. (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.stoelrivesworldofemployment.com/2015/08/articles/labor/northwester
n-university-football-players-cant-vote-for-union-representation-but-its-not-over-untilits-over/?utm.source=feedburner&utm medium=feed&utm-campaign=Feed%3A+
WorldOfWork+%28Stoel+Rives+World+of+Employment%29 (stating that on appeal,
the Board accepted no less than 100 amicus briefs on the Regional Director's decision,
many of which "vigorously argued" for employee status).
91. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6-7 (Aug. 17, 2015).
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. The Board's logic is as follows: football teams have consistently
relinquished power to the NCAA, which now exercises a substantial degree of control
over the operations of individual teams such that any labor issue directly involving only
an individual team would also affect the NCAA and other member institutions. Id. at
4-5. Additionally, bargaining as a single unit team would create an inherent
asymmetry in labor relations regulatory regimes because the Board would be unable
to exert jurisdiction over public universities within the NCAA because they are not
"employers" within the meaning of the Act. Id.
94. Id. at 6.
95. See id. ("[S]ubsequent changes in the treatment of scholarship players could
outweigh the considerations that motivate our decision today.").
96. See id. ("We emphasize that our decision today ... is limited to Northwestern's
scholarship football players . . . .").

97. See id. ("[W]e therefore do not address what the Board's approach might be to
a petition for all FBS scholarship football players [at private universities] . . . .").
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assert jurisdiction, citing the policies of the Act" and the absence of
congressional direction on who constitutes an "employee.""
C.

Columbia: Determining Who is an "Employee" Under the Act and A
Standardfor AssertingJurisdiction

One year after the Northwestern decision, the Board in Columbia was
presented with the question of whether students who work at a
university in connection with their education are statutory employees

under the Act."o
This basic question of statutory interpretation,
however, turned out to be multifaceted because Congress failed to
provide a concrete and meaningful definition of the word
"employee."'o
This Section thus explores the Columbia Board's
analysis by discussing the statutory interpretation, the common law

test, and the jurisdictional standard prongs of the Board's analysis.
1.

The statutory analysis

The Act does not define with specificity either "employees" or
"employers," so the Board has historically discerned legislative intent
by relying on its precedent. Board precedent broadly interprets the

98. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 3 (noting that the Board
conflates "the policies of the Act" exclusively with "promoting stability in labor
relations," providing not one other policy goal or aim of the Act in its opinion).
Moreover, although the Board may decline to assert jurisdiction of a complaint
squarely under the Act, it has seldom done so. See infra note 123 and accompanying
text (showing the available discretionary avenues for declining jurisdiction); see also
Contract Servs., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 862 (1973) (declining to assert jurisdiction due to
foreign relations considerations); Walter A. Kelley, 139 N.L.R.B. 744, 746-47 (1962)
(declining to assert jurisdiction for the horse-racing industry because it was deemed to
be a local activity). And, when the Board has done so, it is not uncommon for it to
reconsider its original decision. For example, in The American League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, the Board reconsidered its initial reluctance to assert jurisdiction over
labor relations in the context of professional sports and subsequently recognized the
importance of having federal labor law govern the relationship between league clubs
and their players. Am. League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 191 (1969);
see also Big East Conference, 282 N.L.R.B. 335, 341-42 (1986) (asserting jurisdiction
over an NCAA Division I Athletics Conference); N. Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B.
1317, 1319-21 (1978) (assertingjurisdiction over the North American Soccer League).
99. "[T]he absence of explicit congressional direction ... does not preclude the
Board from reaching any particular type of employment." Id. at 3 n.7 (quoting NLRB
v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 681 (1980)) (stating that nothing in the Act or its
legislative history provides explicit direction regarding the Board's treatment of
college football programs).
100. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).
101. Id. at 4; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (indicating the vagueness
of the statute's definitions).
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statutory language to include "any employee" and exclude welldelineated statutory exceptions, or categories of workers legislatively
precluded from coverage.10 2 For example, the Columbia Board noted
that the absence of "students" from the Act's enumerated categories of
excluded workers is "strong evidence" of statutory coverage.' The
Supreme Court has agreed with the Board's overall interpretation,
emphasizing the "breadth" of the statutory language as "striking" and
"squarely" applying to any employee, as long as he or she works for
another in return for compensation."'
In determining whether student assistants meet the statutory
definition of "employee," the Columbia Board's analysis was simple.
First, it reasoned that to give effect to precedent means to broadly
interpret the term "employee" to encompass student athletes."0
Second, the Board observed that "private universities" do not fall
within any of the specified exceptions and, moreover, that the Board
has exercised jurisdiction over private universities since 1970.106
However, the Board ultimately could not overcome the vagueness of
the statute and could not decide whether student assistants were
statutory employees based on the plain language of the statute. 107
Instead, the Board found that where Congress uses a term in a statute but
does not define it, Congress means to incorporate the "established meaning"
of the term with reference to common law agency doctrine.10 8

102. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 4 (emphasis added); see also National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) ("The term employee... shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service
of any family ... or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor....").
103. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 4; see supra note 102 and accompanying
text (noting the statutory exclusions for who can be considered an "employee").
104. Id. at 4 (quoting NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995);
Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (defining
"employee" as "any employee").
105. See Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 4 (noting that the phrasing of the
Act seems to reiterate an ordinary dictionary definition of "employee": "any person
who works for another in return for financial or other compensation").
106. Id. Additionally, the Board pointed out that neither legislative history nor the
design of the Act itself indicates support for excluding student assistants or private
universities from statutory coverage. Id. at 5.
107. Id. at 4.
108. Id. at 4-5 (citing Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 94).
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2.

The common law test

The Columbia decision reaffirmed the importance of the right to

control test in determining who is a statutory employee under the Act,
and it explicitly overruled the persistent economic relationship test,
which focused solely on compensation.'" In returning to the right to
control test, 1 o the Board held that "common-law employment . .
requires that the employer ha[s] the right to control the employee's
work, and that the work be performed in exchange for
compensation.""1 The Board declared that it is "unnecessary" to dive
into the question of whether the relationship between the purported
employees and their employer is primarily economic because of the
difficulty of applying that standard."'
Under the right to control test, the Board ruled that student
assistants are indubitably employees under the Act."' First, the Board
analyzed whether the university had control over the details of the
student assistants' duties."'
The student research assistants were
required to perform a litany of tasks normally under the purview of
faculty: planning and giving lectures, writing and grading exams,
holding office hours, and performing other clerical tasks."' These
tasks, which "frequently take on a role akin to that of faculty," were
required as a condition of each student's academic requirements and
would entail each student to commit at least 20 hours per week."16
Those students who did not adequately perform their duties were
subject to corrective counseling or removal.117 The Board concluded
that "the fact that students are thrust wholesale into many of the core
109. Id. at 3, 15 (" [T]he Brown University majority instead relied on what it perceived
to be a fundamental tenet of the Act and a prerequisite to statutory coverage: a
relationship that is primarilyeconomic in character .... ).
110. Courts also have traditionally adopted the right to control the details of the
work test for determining an employment relationship. See MITTEN ET AL., supra
note 39, at 139 ("The right to control test examines whether the employer possessed
the right to control the manner, means, and details of the worker's performance ...
[factors include] the terms of the employment agreement, the actual exercise of
control, the method of payment, the furnishing of equipment, and the right to
terminate the worker.").
111. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 15.
112. Id. at 15-16; see also Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, *53-54
(Mar. 26, 2014) (noting that the Brown "primarily economic" analysis is inapplicable
to the college athlete context due to its lack of flexibility).
113. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 15.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 14, 16.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 15.
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duties of teaching," one of the university's most important revenuegenerating activities, suggests that the university had domineering control
of research assistants and was not merely inculcating teaching skills. 1
Second, the Board analyzed whether the student assistants
performed these tasks in exchange for compensation.1 9 The students
typically received full financial aid in the form of tuition and a stipend,
which the university conditioned upon performance of their teaching
duties. 2 o Removal from a position for failure to adequately perform
the job duties resulted in a loss of financial aid, meaning that the
student assistants' scholarships were conditioned on the performance
of their teaching duties-amounting to offering compensation as
consideration for their work."' After applying the common law right
to control test, the Board concluded that it had "no difficulty . .
finding that all the petitioned-for classifications here comprise
statutory employees."12

A standardfor assertingjurisdiction
Although the Board is tasked with enforcing federal labor laws, it has
discretionary power to decline jurisdiction."' The Board in Columbia
did not provide a clear-cut rule for when it should decline jurisdiction
over a petition to recognize a bargaining unit, but instead it suggested
3.

118. Id. at 16.
119. Id. at 14.
120. Id. at 13-15.
121. Id. at 15 ("Receipt of a full financial award is conditioned upon their
performance of teaching duties. When they do not perform . . .. they will not be
paid.").
122. Id. at 16. The Board noted that the university had a significant interest in
overseeing student assistants' teaching duties because the students conferred a massive
financial benefit to the university: student assistants advanced a key business operation
of the school-teaching undergraduate courses-and, in doing so, they subsidized the
university's largest revenue-generating activity by saving the university the need to hire
additional faculty. Id. at 15.
123. It is important to note that there are two legal avenues of discretion available
to the Board for declining jurisdiction: (1) under section 14(c) (1) of the Act to
"decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employers," where in the Board's opinion, "the effect of such labor dispute on
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction"; and
(2) pursuant to NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, which
recognized its discretion to assert jurisdiction over an individual case. See National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (2012); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951) ("Even when ... the Board [is justified] to
take jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes properly declines to do so,
stating that the polices of the Act would not be effectuated by its assertion of
jurisdiction in that case.").
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that it should assertjurisdiction whenever doing so would "further the
policies of the Act." 2 ' However, the Board stressed that to decline
jurisdiction when a category of employee meets the statutory or
common law test under the Board's precedent, there must be
"compelling" reasons.125
Accordingly, the Board in Columbia emphasized two main factors to
consider in determining whether to decline jurisdiction: (1) whether
asserting jurisdiction would promote the policies and purposes of the
Act, and (2) whether the Act is capable of managing labor disputes that
would arise in such a context.12' For the latter factor, the Board
consulted available empirical evidence to show how bargaining rights
would either benefit or harm employees and employers.1 27
Analyzing the first factor, the Columbia opinion in no uncertain
terms proclaimed that the purpose of the Act is to "encourag[e] the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining[] and to protect"
workers' full freedom to express a choice for or against collective
bargaining representation.'
The Columbia opinion criticized the
Brown board for straying from promoting this purpose and basing its
decision to decline jurisdiction on theoretical harms " it perceived
would result if it permitted collective bargaining in the educational
context. 130 Ultimately, the Board in Columbia confidently found that
permitting student assistants to choose whether to bargain collectively
would clearly promote the purposes and policies of the Act.'
Under the second factor, the Board wrote a scathing critique of the
Brown Board's failure to acknowledge the Act's resilience in settling
labor disputes in lieu of empirical data confirming that an employment
124.
125.

Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 13.
Id. at 5.

126. See id. at 7 n.56, 9 (stating that "in exercising this discretion, we tread carefully
and with an eye toward the Act's purposes. . ." and asserting that "the historic flexibility
of collective bargaining as a practice" is instrumental in dismantling Brown's claims
that collective bargaining would not promote the purposes of the Act).

127.

Id. at 9.

128. Id. at 6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra notes 32-37 and
accompanying text (explaining the historical purpose of the Act).
129. The Brown Board argued that (1) the education process is personal, in contrast
to the collective bargaining process; (2) that the goal of collective bargainingpromoting equal bargaining power-was foreign to the educational context; and
(3) that collective bargaining was a threat to traditional academic freedoms. Columbia

Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 3.
130. See id. at 7 (criticizing the Brown Board for elevating theoretical arguments
about harm to the educational context without considering the purposes of the Act or
empirical evidence).

131.

Id.
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relationship exists. 13 The Columbia Board explained that the Brown
Board's conclusions were "entirely theoretical" and "aptly criticized"
by leading labor law scholars.13 The Board imported logic from
different sectors where collective bargaining had succeeded in the face
of dire predictions. Most relevant is the public university context,
where graduate student employees' collective bargaining is a fact of
American university life."' Although governed by state law, the Board
reasoned that the success of collective bargaining in public educational
institutions highlights the university's dual role as educator and
employer and suggests it need not be an impediment to finding an
employment relationship under the Act. 3
Further, one of the Board's main conclusions in Brown was that the
student-teacher relationship was based on mutual academic interests,
in contrast to the economic interests that characterize the employeeemployer relationship."3 6 Thus, the Brown Board reasoned, affording
student assistants the status of employees under the Act would be
antithetical to the educational process.' The Board refuted that
notion in Columbia, arguing that the Act is flexible and tenable to the
student-teacher context because it permits the Board to define the

132. See id. at 2 ("[T]he Brown University Board's... 'fundamental belief that the
imposition ... of collective bargaining on graduate students ... would be inconsistent
with the purposes [of the Act]' ... is unsupported by legal authority, by empirical
evidence, or by the Board's actual experience.").
133. Id. at 7; see also Michael C. Harper,judicial Control of the NationalLaborRelations
Board's Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 221 (2009)
(explaining that in Brown, the majority departed from the most pertinent precedent,
actively disregarded any available empirical evidence, and diverged from the dissenters
and with the majority in the New York University decision in a manner that destroyed
any claim for deference to its expertise in labor law); Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C.
Malamud, The NLRB in AdministrativeLaw Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function
and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2076-77 (2009) (illustrating that the
Brown majority offered no empirical support in rejecting the arguments of the
dissenters and instead presented unpersuasive arguments).
134. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 9.
135. Id. Further, the Board analogized the private university context to the national
security, national defense, and acute care hospital sectors, elevating them as a model
for sectors able to effectively integrate collective bargaining into their modes of
business. See id. at 11. The Board noted that some concerns raised by Columbia are
generic complaints about the statutory requirements inherent in collective
bargaining-such as bargaining over staffing levels and the prospective of strikes-and
that successful collective bargaining in other industries proves that these problems,
"common to nearly all industries in which the Board accords employees bargaining
rights," are also resolvable in the private university context. Id.
136. Id. at 3.
137. See id.
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scope of bargaining, which is a significant tool for preserving genuine
academic freedom and ensuring that these different roles can coexist."'s The Brown Board also seemed concerned that finding an
employment relationship in the university context would create labor
disputes that would harm the educational mission,"' but the Board in
Columbiarejected that claim. It clarified that federal labor law presupposes
that conflict will arise once an employment relationship is recognized,
but collective bargaining's "historic flexibility" is preferable to the
status quo for successfully navigating delicate labor disputes. 40
Thus, the Board will be justified in declining jurisdiction only by
looking to the Act's policies and purposes and its ability to manage
labor disputes that arise. Columbia's statutory and common law tests for
determining who is an employee under the Act and its factors for
determining whether to assert jurisdiction lead to the conclusion that
college athletes should also be accorded the protections under the Act.141

138. Id. at 7. Universities have drafted management and academic rights clauses as
another tool to resolve problems relating to collective bargaining in educational
settings, and those clauses have included language in student assistants' collective
bargaining agreements giving management specific rights relating to course content,
assignments, exams, class sizes, and methods of grading and instruction. Id. at 9.
139. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 498 (2004) (Liebman & Walsh, Members,
dissenting) (characterizing the core of the majority's argument as a concern for how
imposing collective bargaining will harm academic freedom).
140. See Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 9,12 (noting that student assistants
are "fervently lobbying" their schools for better representation and that suggests the
current model of relations is unresponsive to student assistants' needs).
141. The Board attempted to distinguish its refusal to assert jurisdiction over
college athletes in Northwesternfrom the Board's erroneous refusal to assertjurisdiction
over student assistants in Brown in a cautiously worded footnote:
[I] n exercising this discretion, we tread carefully and with an eye toward the
Act's purposes. In Northwestern University, we denied the protections of the
Act to certain college athletes-without ruling on their employee statusbecause, due to their situation within and governance by an athletic
consortium dominated by public universities, we found that our extending
coverage to them would not advance the purposes of the Act. Here,
conversely, we have no reason to believe that extending bargaining rights will
not meaningfully advance the goals of the Act.
Id. at. 7 n.56 (citations omitted). However, the Board's considerations in Columbia for
determining whether asserting jurisdiction would advance the purposes of the Act
actually suggest that it should do so for collegiate athletes in revenue-generating sports
at Division I schools.
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CollegiateFootballin the Twenty-First Century

The nature and organizationof NCAA football
The nature and organization of revenue-generating sports at
Division I schools can differ by sport or conference. However, because
the petitioned-for bargaining unit at Northwestern University
consisted of football players, a basic understanding of the nature and
organization of Division I athletics and the NCAA is crucial to dismantling
the Board's reasons for refusing to assertjurisdiction in Northwestern. 142
The NCAA can be traced back to the early twentieth century, where
significant injuries and deaths in college sports led President
Theodore Roosevelt to reform college football.14 1 Originally named
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States, the NCAA
became an official organization in 1910, representing over sixty
member institutions."4 In 1973, the NCAA began recognizing levels
of competition within intercollegiate athletics with Division numbers
(I, II, and III),145 and in 1978, competition within those divisions led to
a further partition of college football into subdivisions-later named
the Football Bowl Subdivision and the Football Championship
Subdivision." At its core, the NCAA seeks to advance nine goals to
promote its main purpose: keeping amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics. 14 7 The NCAA thus exercises a great deal of control over
member institutions and college athletes to ensure that college
athletes' amateur status is preserved. 48
1.

142. See supranotes 87-94 and accompanying text (explaining the Board's logic for
declining to assert jurisdiction).
143.

National College Athletic

Association (NCAA),

INTERNET FAQ

ARcHIvES,

http://www.faqs.org/sports-science/Mo-P/National-Collegiate-Athletic-AssociationNCAA.html; accord Dan Treadway, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.

6, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-treadway/johnny-manzielncaa-eligibilityb_3020985.html.
144. Mary Kate Bird, Comment, Northwestern University: Opening the Door for
Unionizationin CollegiateAthletics, 84 UMKC L. REV. 423, 427 (2015).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIc Ass'N Div. I MANUAL § 1.3.1 (2016-17)
[hereinafter NCAA Div. I MANUAL] ("A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete
as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.").
148. See Bird, supra note 144, at 430 (detailing the responsibilities that each member
institution and each college athlete must fulfill to maintain their amateur status and
eligibility to participate in collegiate sports). Additionally, college athletes can forfeit
their amateur status in myriad ways: entering into an agreement with an agent or
entering a professional draft, receiving payment for using athletic skill in his or her
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The NCAA has grown to be a hundred-million-dollar industry"'9 and
is considered the "oldest, wealthiest, and most powerful of the national
associations, governing the largest, richest, and most popular sports
programs in higher education."' The NCAA has grown increasingly
commercial throughout its history, delving into an array of different
sports and fostering lucrative partnerships with sponsors."' The
commercialization of collegiate sports contrasts sharply with the
limited financial benefits available to college athletes, whose
scholarships are limited to grant-in-aid."' The NCAA restricts a college
athlete's scholarship to the amount required to cover tuition, housing,
books, and food plans; moreover, the scholarship is provided "solely
on the basis of athletic ability."'
Although the NCAA prohibits
scholarship award cancellation or reduction based on the athletic
performance of an athlete," many universities are able to circumvent
the cancellation clause by reducing or cancelling awards for purported
reasons outside the scope of athletic performance. 15
Lastly, the NCAA's control over its member institutions permeates
into the competitions and practice schedules of intercollegiate
sport, receiving any financial assistance from a sports organization on the basis of skill,
and accepting a contract or making a promise to play professional sports after college.
See NCAA DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 147, §§ 12.1.2 (a)-(g).
149. SeeTreadway, supranote 143 (stating that the NCAA accrued over $800 million
dollars in revenue in 2011).
150. Ronald Waicukauski, The Regulation of Academic Standards in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 1982 ARiz. ST. L.J. 79, 81 (1982).
151. See Brown, supra note 87, at 1863-64 (noting that the NCAA signed a $10.8
billion agreement with CBS Sports for broadcasting rights to the NCAA Division I
Men's Basketball Tournament and a $500 million contract with ESPN for broadcasting
rights to other NCAA championships, while only incurring about $100 million per year
for all of its NCAA championships' operating costs).
152. See NCAA Div. I MANUAL, supra note 147, §§ 15.1-15.2 (listing prohibitions on
college athletes' compensation).
153. McCormick & McCormick, supranote 29, at 78, 100,109. This often results in
many full-scholarship athletes living below the national poverty line. Id. at 78-79, 79
n.30. As of 2015, however, schools in five Division I conferences voted to give athletes
the full cost of attendance as part of a full athletics scholarship. Michelle Brutlag
Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015,
6:58 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomy-schoolsadopt-cost-attendance-scholarships.
A full scholarship will now also include
"academic-related supplies, transportation and other similar items." Id.
154. NCAA Div. I MANUAL, supra note 147, § 15.3.4.3.
155. Kathleen Megan, Legislators HearTestimony on Need to Spell Out Detailson Athletic
Scholarships,

Medical

Expenses,

HARTFORD

COURANT

(Feb.

9,

2011),

http://articles.courant.com/2011-02-09/news/hc-college-sport-scholarships-020920110208 1athletic-scholarship-athletic-recruiters-national-college-playersassociation.
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The NCAA tracks "[c]ountable athletically related
athletics.'"
activities ('CARA')," which include any required college athletic
activity that is at the direction or supervision of one of the institution's
coaching staff.157 Each college athlete is prohibited from participating
in more than four hours of CARA-related activities each day and twenty
hours per week.15 s The goal of these daily and weekly limitations is to
ensure that academics do not take a backseat to athletics; however, the
efficacy of the CARA restrictions is highly questionable.5 9
A movement toward recognizing the rights of college athletes
In recent years, the NCAA and its member institutions have faced
major legal challenges covering the gamut of issues. Scholarship
amounts, player health, player pay, and amateurism rules were all at
stake in pending lawsuits across the United States.'" At the same time,
the NCAA and the Board have issued new proposals and decisions
aiming to curb the exploitation of college athletes and expand
protections on college campuses.' 6 1 These forces have converged to
create a movement toward recognizing the rights of college athletes162
that paallels the Columbia Board's expansion of employment rights to
students in the private university context.
2.

Federallitigation against the NCAA: O'Bannon and Berger
Litigation across the country has placed the NCAA on the defensive,
forcing the institution to acknowledge that, at least in federal court,
college athletes are deserving of many of the same rights as
professionally employed athletes. Though college athletes have had
a.

156. See NCAA Div. I MANUAL, supra note 147, § 17.01.1.
157. Id. § 17.02.1.
158. Id. § 17.1.7.1.
159. Id. § 17.01.1; seeBird, supranote 144, at 432-33 (discussing how football players
devote an average ranging from thirty to sixty hours per week on athletic-related
activities and reporting that coaching staff and players actively get around CARA
rules).
160. Infra Section II.D.2(a). See generally Patrick Vint, Ranking the NCAA's 5 Biggest
Legal Battles, from Least to Most Threatening, SB NATION (Mar. 20, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/3/20/5528032/ncaa-lawsuitsobannon-kessler-union (discussing prominent lawsuits that are a threat to the status
quo of college amateurism in collegiate sports).
161. Infra Sections II.D.2(b)-(c).
162. See Marcy Tracy & Ben Strauss, Court Strikes down Payments to College Athletes,
N.Y. TimEs (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/sports/obannonncaa-case-court-of-appeals-ruling.html?_r=0 (noting that the Northwestern decision was
decided in the midst of a national movement that has "generally turned toward the
expansion of athletes' rights").
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varying degrees of success in asserting their rights, the courts'
willingness to address these issues and the decisions themselves are
simply another crack in the conventional notion promoted by the
NCAA and its member institutions that college athletes are merely
students, underserving of legal rights afforded to professional athletes.
Though at the frontlines of the various legal battles against the
NCAA are health-related concerns," the NCAA has faced its most
direct threats to college athletes' amateur status in the antitrust realm.
The NCAA was playing defense on the antitrust front as it fought a
federal court ruling in 2014 blocking the NCAA from enforcing its
rules that prevent marketers from paying college athletes for use of
their names, images, and likenesses in O'Bannon v. NCAA." As the
"first serious legal challenge to the [NCAA's] amateurism rules,"
O'Bannon is heralded as the piece of litigation that brought national
attention to the legal fight' over amateurism and player

163. The first concussion case brought against the NCAA was Arrington v. NCAA, a
class action lawsuit filed in 2011. In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Student-Athlete
Concussion Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Ill. 2016); see also Arrington v. NCAA
(In re NCAA Concussion Injury Litig.), 988 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2013)
(centralizing Arrington litigation into two related pending actions); Vint, supra
note 160. The lawsuit targeted the NCAA's disregard for countless studies chronicling
the high incidence of concussions among athletes and the risk of brain defects from
sustained concussions. 314 F.R.D. at 585. The NCAA and Arrington ultimately settled
the lawsuit. Id. at 608. Although the settlement did not contain a cash payment for
the plaintiffs, it mandated a new national protocol for head injuries sustained by
players that includes a $70 million commitment to a monitoring fund for former
athletes and a $5 million fund for concussion research. See, e.g., Ben Strauss, Judge
Approves Settlement in Head Injuries Suit Against N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/27/sports/ncaafootball/judge-approvessettlement-in-head-injuries-suit-against-ncaa.html;
John Keilman and Michelle
Manchir, NCAA Reaches $75 Million Settlement in ConcussionLawsuit, CHI. TRMUNE (July
29, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-ncaareaches-75-million-settlement-in-concussion-lawsuit-20140729-story.html. Additionally,
the Arrington court refused to give the NCAA blanket immunity, opening up the NCAA
to future liability for personal injuries and paving the way for new lawsuits. Strauss,
supra. For example, football players from various public and private universities filed
a total of six health-related class-action lawsuits against the NCAA in 2016 as it finalized
the settlement in Arrington. See, e.g.,Jon Solomon, Next Wave of ConcussionLawsuits Hits
Conferences, and for Penn State, Schools, CBS SPORTS (May 18, 2016, 7:49 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/next-wave-of-concussion-lawsuitshits-conferences-and-for-penn-state-schools.
164. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014), rev'd in part, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2015).
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compensation.' 65 The lawsuit was initially brought against the NCAA
for television footage and EA Sports' NCAA video games that used
players' images, names, and likenesses.1" A group of former and
current Division I football and basketball players requested that a
portion of those revenues be placed aside for the players whose images
made the television revenues so lucrative.167
The district court agreed with the players and ruled that the NCAA
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and stated that restraining member
schools' ability to compensate Division I men's basketball and football
players for use of their names, images, and likenesses is an unlawful
"restraint of trade."" The appeal, however, left both sides wanting
more. The Ninth Circuit affirmed part of the lower court's opinion,
holding that the "NCAA is not above the antitrust laws" and that
barring payments to athletes would violate the Sherman Act. Yet the
Ninth Circuit also reversed in part, and held that the NCAA could limit
colleges from offering college athletes as little as $5,000 per year in
deferred compensation in exchange for commercial use of their
names, images, and likenesses.' 6 9

O'Bannon was thus monumental because it was th first college
athlete's challenge against the NCAA to gain any traction in court, and
it forced reporters and commentators to scrutinize the college sports
establishment, placing the NCAA on its heels.17 o In particular, because
antitrust laws apply fully to both private and public schools, antitrust
cases like O'Bannon offer a distinct legal path for college athletes at
Division I institutions attempting to vindicate their rights.1 71 Although
the Supreme Court denied review of the case in 2016, O'Bannon is a
harbinger for the NCAA.

165. Joe Nocera, O'Bannon Ruling Stands, but NCAA's Status Quo May' Yet Collapse,
N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/sports/ncaaobannon-case-ruling-supreme-court.html?_r-0.
166. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 965.
167. Vint, supranote 160.
168. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 988, 1007-08. The court also enjoined the NCAA
from enforcing any rules preventing its member schools from depositing a portion of
its licensing revenue in trust for college athletes, payable when they leave school or
their eligibility expires. Id. at 1008.
169. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078-79. Additionally, the court affirmed the lower
court's injunction prohibiting the NCAA from permitting its member schools to
provide up to the cost of attendance to their college athletes. Id. at 1079.
170. Nocera, supranote 165.
171. Sean Gregory, Here's the Road Ahead for College Athletes After Union Setback, TIME
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://time.com/4002245/after-union-setback-heres-the-roadahead-for-college-athletes.
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The case has sparked a national dialogue around the plight of
college athletes under NCAA rules172 and has inspired a myriad of
lawsuits against the NCAA.173 Berger v. NCAA, 17 ' a 2016 class action
lawsuit naming as defendants the NCAA and more than one hundred
Division I schools, is one of the latest challenges to the amateur status
of college athletes.175 Mirroring the petitioners' claim in Northwestern,
the plaintiffs alleged that as college athletes, they were employees
under the Act and were entitled to minimum wages under that
statute.17 ' The players argued that determining employee status was a
172. In the wake of O'Bannon, there was an increased focus on health concerns and
the amount of time athletes devote to sports; in response, some schools decided to
award four-year scholarships instead of the traditional one-year scholarship, and
athletic conferences increased benefits to college athletes to cover the full cost of
attendance-a measure the NCAA voted down in 2011. Nocera, supra note 165; see
also Mitch Sherman, Full Cost of Attendance Passes 79-1, ESPN (Jan 18, 2005),
http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/12185230/power-5-conferencespass-cost-attendance-measure-ncaa-autonomy-begins
(highlighting the "historic
change" that came of the 2015 NCAA convention after the Power 5 conferences voted
for increased stipends, a college-athlete assistance fund as part of a concussion safety
protocol, and the full cost-of-attendance legislation that would prevent college athletes
from losing their scholarships due to injury).
173. See Nocera, supra note 165 (arguing that the complaint brought by Shabazz
Napier, a star guard for Connecticut, and the complaint filed by Kain Colter, the
Northwestern quarterback, would not have been brought were it not for Ed O'Bannon,
the basketball player at the University of California, Los Angeles, paving the way in his
lawsuit challenging the NCAA's amateurism rules). Moreover, the O'Bannon decision
paved the way for two additional lawsuits in 2015 targeting the NCAA's amateurism
rules: the Jenkins case alleging that the NCAA's compensation limits violate antitrust
laws, and the Alston case, seeking damages for all the years in which athletes were not
compensated for the full cost of attendance. Marc Tracy, Case that CouldErodeAmateur
Model
Takes
a
Small
Step,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Oct.
1,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/sports/case-that-could-erode-amateur-modeltakes-a-small-step.html; see also Scooby Axson, Ex-Northwestern Basketball Player Sues
NCAA,
School over
Transfer, SPORTs
ILLUSTRATED
(Nov.
15,
2006)
https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2016/11/15/ex-northwestern-basketballplayer-sues-ncaa (detailing a 2016 lawsuit by a Northwestern University basketball
player, Johnnie Vassar, alleging that the NCAA's transfer regulations violate antitrust
laws) ; Jon Solomon,Judge Denies Request by NCAA, Conferences to Dismissfeffrey Kessler Case,
CBS SPORTS (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/judgedenies-request-by-ncaa-conferences-todismiss-jeffrey-kessler-case
(highlighting
a
federal court's decision to deny the NCAA's request to dismiss a lawsuit filed byJeffrey
Kessler, a high-profile sports labor attorney, arguing that the NCAA has unlawfully
capped player compensation in violation of antitrust laws).
174. 162 F. Supp. 3d 845 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
175. Id. at 847.
176. Id. Under the Department of Labor guidelines, the players reasoned, it was
indisputable that athletes in Division I conferences deserved minimum wage and
overtime pay under the Act. Id.

1564

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1533

fact-intensive inquiry and that athletes are more deserving of
employment status than other university-employed students because
athletes perform more rigorous work over longer hours, all while
under stricter university supervision."' Ultimately, however, the
complaint had significant procedural difficulties that contributed to
the court's dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction.1 78
Since then, at least one other former college athlete has filed a case
against the NCAA. In 2016, a former linebacker for the University of
Southern California, Lamar Dawson, filed a similar class action against
the NCAA for alleged minimum-wage violations in a federal district
Simply put, the NCAA is facing an
court in California.179
unprecedented challenge to its mission of promoting amateurism in
college athletics, the likes of which it has not seen before.
b.

The Board

Not only have O'Bannon and other lawsuits led to increased judicial
scrutiny on the NCAA's potentially unlawful restrictions over college
athletes, but the Board has also focused on the NCAA and its member
institutions in response to complaints filed in its regional offices. The
most glaring example is the Regional Director's monumental decision
in Northwestern,"o and its subsequent appeal in which the Board never
refuted the notion that college athletes competing in revenuegenerating sports at Division I schools are employees under the Act.'
Even more remarkable, however, is the memorandum that the General
Counsel of the Board issued onJanuary 31, 2017."'
177. Id. at 849; see Matthew Perlman, Ex-NCAA Athletes Tell 7th Circ. 1ISA Suit Wrongly
Tossed, LAw360 (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:10 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/772651/exncaa-athletes-tell-7th-circ-flsa-suit-wrongly-tossed (summarizing the players' argument
in their brief on appeal to the Ninth Circuit).
178. Perlman, supranote 177.
179. Travis Waldron, Former USC Football Player Sues NCAA over 'Unpaid Wages',
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/uscncaa-college-athlete-lawsuit us_57ebd3eee4b024a52d2bb092.
180. Supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the
Regional Director's opinion).
181. Supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
182. Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, National Labor
Relations Board, to all Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers
(Jan. 31, 2017). The Board consists of two branches: the five members of the Board
and the General Counsel, an independent prosecutor responsible for overseeing
unfair labor practice complaints. WONG, supra note 39, at 523. Additionally, the
General Counsel has the autonomy to prosecute a complaint, and his or her
determination to not issue a complaint is not reviewable by either the Board or a
federal court. Id.
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The General Counsel is imbued by statute with unreviewable "final
authority" with respect to the investigation of unfair labor practices
charges under section 3 of the Act."' Pursuant to this authority, the
General Counsel's office issues memoranda directly to regional field
offices to provide policy guidance with respect to its investigations. 18 4
In 2017, the General Counsel issued a memorandum to regional
directors to explain how the General Counsel's office would apply the
Board's recent decisions in Columbia and Northwestern in the unfair
labor practice arena.185
The General Counsel's memorandum,
however, proved to be more than a mere summary of Board precedent.
The General Counsel decided to directly address the question of
whether scholarship football players at NCAA Division I private schools
are employees under the Act.186

In answering that question, the General Counsel first applied the
Board's "expansive" statutory definition of "employee" and then
turned to Columbia's common law test."' Ultimately, the General
Counsel proclaimed that "the application of the statutory definition of
employee and the common-law test lead to the conclusion that Division I
FBS scholarship football players are employees under the NLRA.""'
The General Counsel's memorandum was the first time that the
Board directly ruled on the question of whether college athletes are

183.

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2012);

NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD, Reports & Guidance, https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance

(last

visited Aug. 30, 2017); see also WONG, supra note 39, at 520 (detailing the procedures
in the Act for unfair labor practice cases and highlighting the General Counsel's role).
184. NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
BOARD,
Reports
&
Guidance,

https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).
185. Memorandum from Richard F. GriffinJr., supranote 182, at 1 (explaining that
because the Board's decisions in Columbia and Northwestern were representation cases
that "did not directly address the right of the workers in those cases to seek protection
against unfair labor practices," the memorandum serves as a guide for employers,
labor unions, and employees).
186. Id. at 2. "[I]t is clear that nothing in Northwestern precludes the finding that
Northwestern (or other private college/university) scholarship football players are
employees under the Act .. . [s]ince the issue was raised but left unresolved in
Northwestern, it is important that these individuals know whether the Act's protection
extends to them." Id. at 17.

187.

Id. at 18-22.

188. Id. at 23. Notably, the Board's Associate General Counsel, BarryJ. Kearney, in
an "advice memorandum" to a regional director on September 22, 2016, similarly
concluded that, "Northwestern's scholarship players are statutory employees [under
the Act]." Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Associate General Counsel,
National Labor Relations Board, to Peter Sung Ohr, Regional Director Region 13

(Sept. 22, 2016) at 1 n.1.
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employees under the Act. 1' Although historic, the memorandum had
a muted effect because General Counsels' memoranda do not carry
the force of law like a full Board decision, and the 2017 memorandum
does not affect the Board's decision in Northwestern to refuse to assert
jurisdiction over college athletes.'" Nonetheless, the General Counsel's
memorandum represents yet another building block toward recognizing
legal rights for Division I college athletes in revenue-generating sports and
illustrates that this legal question will likely spur further litigation.
c.

The NCAA

In response to these developments, the NCAA itself has instituted
new rules and protocols that expand opportunities for its member
institutions to implement pro college-athlete policies."' In 2014, the
NCAA Division I Board of Directors restructured how schools and
conferences govern themselves, ensuring that college athletes will be
represented at every decision making level."
NCAA President Mark Emmert praised the adoption of the new
governance model, calling it a "compromise on all sides that will better

189. SeeJake New, NLRB Chips Away at AthleteAmateurism, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 2,
2017) (quoting the Executive Director of the National College Players Association,
Ramogi Huma, stating that the 2017 memoranda is "a major milestone" for declaring
that the General Counsel's Office is "committed to protecting college athletes'
employee rights under the labor laws").
190. See Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Lawyer Sees Some College FootballPlayersas Employees, with
Rights,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Feb.
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-lawyer-sees-some(explaining that the General
college-athletes-as-employees-with-rights.html?-r=0
Counsel's memorandum does not carry the force of law); see also Hassan A. Kanu,
NLRB Counsel Has Significant Authority but Little Time, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2017)
(arguing that the NLRB General Counsel who issued the 2017 memorandum is
"unlikely to take actions that would have a substantial influence on labor policy"
because his term expires October 31, 2017, and the balance of the Board is going to
shift toward a Republican majority that is less sympathetic to organized labor).
191. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's and its
member institutions' recent policy changes and the concerns that prompted change).

192. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Board Adopts New Division I Structure, NCAA (Aug. 7,
2014, 11:49 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/boardadopts-new-division-i-structure. The new governance model, heralded as a "significant
step into a brighter future for Division I athletics," was adopted in a 16-2 vote and
includes three significant changes that are likely to positively impact college athletes
across the United States: (1) the model expanded the Division I Board of Directors to
include a college athlete and a faculty representative; (2) the model created a new
body, called the Council, which will have two seats for college athletes; and (3) the
model grants flexibility to schools in certain dominant conferences to change rules for
themselves. Id.
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serve ... our student-athletes."' Although there is evidence that
growing scrutiny and perceptions that college athletes are being
financially exploited influenced the new governance model,194 the
model has afforded NCAA member institutions more autonomy to
improve conditions for college athletes. For example, in 2015, the
"autonomy group," comprised of five conferences-the Atlantic Coast,
the Big Ten, the Big 12, the Pac-12, and the Southeastern
Conference-utilized its newfound autonomy under the new
governance model to make several significant changes: the group
voted to (1) give college athletes the full cost of attendance as part of
a full athletics scholarship; (2) end the revocation of scholarships for
athletic reasons; (3) implement more strict concussion management
requirements; and (4) allow college athletes to borrow against their
future earnings to purchase loss-of-value insurance.195
In
implementing these new protections for college athletes, the NCAA
and its member institutions have implicitly recognized the need to
address the plight of college athletes and have, ironically, contributed
to a national trend recognizing the legal rights of Division I college
athletes in revenue-generating sports."*
193. Id.
194. The governance model was adopted within a month of a U.S. Senate hearing
regarding how the NCAA is "fulfilling its stated mission" and "whether the commercial
operation of college athletics is unfairly exploiting the talents and services of college
athletes." Promotingthe Well-Being and Academic Success of CollegeAthletes: HearingBefore
the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 133th Cong. (2014); see also Steve Berkowitz,
NCAA Increases Value of Scholarships in Historic Vote, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2015,
11:05 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/17/ncaaconvention-cost-of-attendance-student-athletes-scholarships/21921073
(noting that
the new governance model was instituted just five months after a federal districtjudge
ruled against the NCAA in the O'Bannonlawsuit).
195. Berkowitz, supra note 194. Moreover, the autonomy group's new changes were
also conveniently timed. See Sherman, supra note 172 (noting that the changes were
"long overdue" and occurred after a "turbulent past year" where the NCAA's model of
amateurism was challenged by the Northwestern case).
196. The autonomy group vote followed several recent changes aimed at improving
conditions for college athletes. See NCAA to Pay for Family Travel Under Pilot Program,
NCAA (Jan. 6, 2015, 2:31 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/ncaa-pay-family-travel-under-pilot-program (showing a NCAA program
providing up to $3,000 in travel, hotel, and meal expenses for family members of each
college athlete who competes in a Final Four semifinal basketball game); Michelle
Brutlag Hosick, Council Approves Meals, Other Student-Athlete Well-Being Rules, NCAA
(Apr.
15, 2014, 4:25
PM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/council-approves-meals-other-student-athlete-well-being-rules
(highlighting the NCAA's new program providing for unlimited meals and snacks in
conjunction with athletics participation to address nutritional needs of college
athletes).
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II. ANALYSIS
In light of its opinion in Columbia, the Board can no longer stand by
its wavering decision' 7 in Northwestern to decline jurisdiction over
college athletes."' This Part applies the Columbia Board's statutory
analysis, common law test, and jurisdictional standard to the case of
college athletes to argue that Columbia compels a finding that college
athletes are statutory employees under the Act. The next time a case
like Northwestern comes before the Board, the Board can and should
assertjurisdiction over this question.
A.

Applying Columbia's Statutory Analysis to College Athletes

The Board in Columbia could not rely on the plain meaning of the
Act to discern whether student assistants were "employees" because
Congress failed to define the statutory terms of "employee" and
"employer" with any specificity." As a result, the Board looked to
other aspects of the statute's language to detect legislative intent,
including its own precedent that broadly interpreted the term "any
employee" and the well-delineated statutory exceptions of workers
precluded from the Act's coverage.2" Those considerations applied
favorably to the context of student assistants because, after all, the
statutory exceptions never mention "students" or "private universities,"
and the breadth of the language is "striking" in that it applies to
numerous categories of workers.o
In the case of college athletes, the application of the Board's
statutory analysis in Columbia is virtually identical and uncontentious.
First, it is hard to refute that the. broadness of the term "any employee"
197. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (showing the Board's trepidation
in declining to assert jurisdiction).
198. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit should take notice and the case should be heard
on appeal. See George Leef, The NLRB Cannot Stop Northwestern'sFootball Playersfrom
Unionizing, FORBEs (Aug. 21, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
georgeleef/2015/08/21/the-nrb-cannot-stop-northwesterns-football-players-fromunionizing/#7b7813ele666 (noting the possibility that Northwesternbe reviewed by the
Seventh Circuit); see also Cianfichi, supra note 5, at 618 (noting that on review, the
Seventh Circuit would apply a deferential look at the agency's interpretation of
"employee" under Chevron to see if it is a reasonable construction).
199. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.RB. No. 90, at 4 (Aug. 23, 2016); see also supranote 44
and accompanying text (highlighting the lack of specificity in the statutory definitions
for "employee" and "employer").
200. See supra Section II.C.1 (establishing a meaning by deferring to precedent and
observing private universities do not fall under an exception).
201. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 4. Moreover, the expansive language
of section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act has been extended to cover paid
union organizers, undocumented aliens, and confidential employees. Id. at 5.
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in the statute and the ordinary dictionary definition of "employee" do
not apply with equal force to college athletes.2 02 To illustrate, both
categories of workers are students at private universities charged with
certain duties for which each will receive financial aid.20 s Additionally,
the statutory exclusions' failure to preclude "athletes," "students," or
"universities" from statutory coverage similarly applies with equal force
to the case of college athletes.' Consequently, the statutory analysis
employed in Columbia, although not dispositive,20 cuts in favor of
finding statutory coverage for college athletes.
. B.

Applying Columbia's Common Law Test to College Athletes

As the Board has made clear, Congress's failure to meaningfully
define a term in the Act signals that the Board ought to interpret the
meaning in accordance with common law agency doctrine.2 " To that
end, the Board in Columbia clearly indicates the right to control test is
the appropriate common law test for determining who is an employee
under the Act.20`
It is unlikely that the Board in its current composition-which
remains mostly unchanged since the Northwestern decision-would
disagree that college athletes meet the common law right to control
test for determining whether a particular bargaining unit should be
accorded the protections of the Act as employees. 20 s First, the Board
202. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (comparing constructions of
"employee" that encompass student athletes).
203. See infraSections III.B.1-2 (arguing that college athletes in revenue-generating
sports in Division I institutions work for their universities in exchange for
compensation).
204. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (identifying
exclusions).
205. See Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 4-5 (cutting in favor of statutory
coverage when using common law agency doctrine).
206. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (referencing common law agency
doctrine due to the lack of specificity in the statutory definition of "employee").
207. See Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90,.at 15 (holding that the right to control
test is the applicable test for determining common law employment).
208. The only member of the five-person quasi-judicial body who is not currently
serving since the opinion in Northwestern was unanimously decided in 2015 is Board
Member Johnson. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Members of the NLRB Since
1935, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-n1rb-1935
(last visited
Aug. 30, 2017). Of the four remaining members, only Member Miscimarra dissented
in Columbia, disagreeing with the majority that student assistants are employees.
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 22, 34 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting).
However, although Member Miscimarra criticizes the use of the right to control test
("My colleagues apply a distorted and highly selective lens ... [d]ismissing everything
as 'not dispositive' [in favor of the right of control test] .... ), his analysis focuses on
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did not decide on that issue in Northwestern, relying on itsjurisdictional
discretion to abstain from resolving the merits of the petition.2 0 Thus,
there is no opinion to the contrary.2 10 Second, Columbia explicitly
overruled the economic relationship test that the Brown Board used to
determine that student assistants were not employees under the Act.
There is therefore no opinion finding that college athletes are not
employees under the right to control test."' Third, the Regional
Director's application of the right to control test to college athletes in
Northwestern remains legally sound because the Board used that same
test in Columbia with university student assistants.212 Thus, the Board's
application of the right to control test to college athletes will be largely
uncontroversial because it is the precedential test.
1.

The first element: College athletes work in exchangefor compensation

To satisfy the first element of the right to control test, college
athletes participating in revenue-generating sports at Division I
In lieu of the
universities must work in exchange for compensation.
Board's decision in Columbia finding that student assistants (including
undergraduate students) are employees under the Act,"' it follows as

the economic relationship test disavowed by the majority. See id. at 32-33 (finding that
research assistants are primarily students, furthering the relevance of the economic
relationship test). Thus, even Member Miscimarra, who joined the Board's decision
in Northwestern, might agree that college athletes would meet the majority's right to
control test. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6 (Aug. 17, 2015)
("[T]he Board's decision not to assert jurisdiction does not preclude [future]
reconsideration of this issue in the future. For example, if the circumstances of
Northwestern's players or FBS football change such that the underpinnings of our
conclusions regarding jurisdiction warrant reassessment, the Board may revisit its
policy in this area.").
209. See supra Sections II.B.1-2 (discussing the majority's decision not to assert
jurisdiction in Northwestern).
210. As of today, there is no opinion, controlling or otherwise, by any Regional
Director or Board Member, finding that college athletes are not employees under the
Act. In fact, the Board-through its General Counsel-has explicitly found that
college athletes are employees under the Act. Memorandum from Richard F.
Griffin, Jr., supranote 182, at 23.
211. The only opinion applying the right to control test to student athletes is the
Regional Director's opinion in Northwestern, which answered that question in the
affirmative. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *68 (Mar. 26, 2014).
212. Columbia. Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 15.
213. Id. at 15 n.100 (citing Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir.
2002)); accord Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004) (quoting NLRB v. Town
Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)).
214. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 13.
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a corollary that all similarly situated students at universities working for
a comparable number of hours and compensation would also satisfy
the first element of the test. In comparison to the graduate and
undergraduate student assistants at issue in Columbia, a bargaining unit
of college athletes in revenue-generating sports at Division I schools
more appropriately establishes that they work in exchange for
compensation."'

By extension, the Northwestem Regional Director's

analysis of the compensated work that college athletes provide for their
universities is a perfect framework for the right to control analysis
because the conditions of the Northwestern football players parallel
the general conditions of Division I college athletes in revenuegenerating sports.1

First, federal courts consider college athletes' scholarships to be
compensation.1

The college athletes in Northwestem received grant-

in-aid scholarships averaging $76,000 per year, which were used to pay
for their educational and living expenses. 1
University rules
prohibited any additional compensation to college athletes related to
their athletic abilities, meaning that college athletes were further
dependent upon the university.2 "
The athletes did not receive
traditional paychecks but, as the Regional Director noted, that was

&

215. Compare id. (holding the "petitioned-for bargaining unit"-including graduate
students, terminal Master's degree students, and undergraduate students-is the
"appropriate unit"), with supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (illustrating that
student athletes are best situated to assess grant-in-aid scholarships).
216. Compare Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *45-47 (holding that
every aspect of college athletes' lives at Northwestern-social, academic, athletic-is
in some way controlled by the university), with McCormick & McCormick, supra
note 29, at 97-108 (describing a composite view of the daily life of Division I men's
basketball and football athletes at different universities and concluding that they are
under constant control of university officials), and McCoy & Knox, supra note 2, at
1074-75 (finding that "coaches and athletic departments exercise a disproportionate
amount of control over student-athletes").
217. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293 (1985)
(holding that food, shelter, and transportation are types of wages); McCormick
McCormick, supra note 29, at 129-30 (arguing that compensation in the form of inkind benefits like tuition, books, and room and board, are compensatory under federal
income tax principles).
218. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *42.
219. Id. at *6; see also Eric Carlson, Comment, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Why the
NCAA Should Lose its Tax-Exempt Status if Scholarship Athletes Are ConsideredEmployees of
Their Universities, 66 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 157, 170 (2016) (explaining that the NCAA
protects its definition of amateurism by preventing compensation of college athletes
in its bylaws); McCoy & Knox, supra note 2, at 1075 (finding that college athletes'
education is often dependent on athletic scholarships because they would often be
unable to pay for their education or living expenses while attending school).
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irrelevant 22 0 because financial aid constituted payment for services
rendered-evinced by the fact that scholarships were terminated when
an athlete stopped participating in collegiate sports.2 21 Additionally,
the fact that the university heavily recruited the players for their
athletic skills 222 and that player participation in Northwestern's football

program was a term of a player's scholarship offer flies in the face of
the university's claim that scholarships should not be considered
compensation in exchange for playing football. 2
In like manner, Columbia University funded most of the Ph.D.
student assistants' education, typically providing tuition and a stipend
for their first five years of study.2 Master's degree students received
compensation for teaching duties and undergraduate students
received compensation for the clerical tasks performed.2 2 ' The
university compensated all students comprising the bargaining unit in
Columbia, whether monetary or otherwise, only after the students

&

220. The Supreme Court has also supported this notion that compensation need
not be in mohey, but can be "financial or other compensation." See NLRB v. Town
.Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1995) (defining employee as another who
works in return for financial or other compensation); Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d
757, 762-65 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that a group of 100 to 200 auxiliary choristers
were employees even though they only performed occasionally and were paid with
dress rehearsal performance tickets and $214 to cover parking and transportation
expenses).
221. Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *17-18. However, college
athletes' scholarships can no longer be terminated for athletic performance. NCAA
Div. I MANUAL, supranote 147, § 15.3.4.3 (stating that decreasing a prospective studentathlete's financial aid is prohibited, from the time the student signs the award letter
until the conclusion of the financial aid agreement). But, there is evidence that
university staff can get around that restriction. See supra note 155 and accompanying
text (illustrating that universities may reduce scholarships by citing anything other
than athletic performance). Moreover, grant-in-aid scholarships can be seen as
inadequate and resemble "scrips," or coupons given to workers as consideration for
work, to be used solely in company stores where the workers could buy things at an
inflated price. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 29, at 78 n.27 (noting that
college athletes' scholarship money eventually trickles back into the university coffer
after tuition, room and board, and food is deducted).
222. See supra note 79 and accompanying text
223. Employer-Appellant's Brief to the Board on Review of Regional Director's
Decision and Direction of Election at 34, Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS
221 (Mar. 26, 2014); see also McCormick & McCormick, supranote 29, at 128 (finding
that athletic scholarships are never given without the requirement of athletic services,
even for third- or fourth-string athletes, whereas scholarships awarded based on merit
require no services in exchange). Once the decision to offer a scholarship becomes
contingent on a player's performance on the field, the less the scholarship looks like
an incentive and the more it looks like compensation for work.
224. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 13-14 (Aug. 23, 2016).
225. Id. at 14.
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completed their respective tasks. Failure to perform those tasks
resulted in termination of their compensation.2
Second, it is undisputed that college athletes "work" gruelingly
throughout the academic year, as well as seasonal periods.2
By
comparison, the student assistants in Columbia generally worked up to
20 hours a week, a considerably less amount of time, while also
expending less energy than most college athletes.2
In contrast to
undergraduate students at Columbia, who are responsible for grading
homework and overseeing laboratory sections,2 " the college football
players at Northwestern provide a more compelling case because they
2
toil year-rounds
s risk serious bodily harm to themselves, 2 1 and
provide a massive economic benefit to their school.2 12 Additionally,
the teaching responsibilities of student assistants are relevant to their
academic pursuits and may count toward earning academic credit or
as a prerequisite for completing their degrees. 3 Whereas for college
athletes, athletics is completely separate from academics because
athletes do not receive credit for participating in collegiate athletics. 234
This suggests that student assistants' "work" is an aspect of their role as
a student, while college athletes' "work," devoid of an educational
component, is more properly characterized as an aspect of their role
as an employee.
226. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (explaining that full financial
aid was conditioned upon a student's performance of his or her teaching duties and
that failure resulted in termination of aid).
227. See supra notes 86-89 (explaining the laborious work that football players at
Northwestern perform as part of their athletic duties).
228. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 14.
229. Id.
230. See infta note 239 and accompanying text (illustrating the control coaches and
the university have over players' itineraries).
231. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 29, at 77 nn.25-26 (discussing the risks
to long-term physical health associated with participation in college football: "From
1977 through 2004, thirty-one college football players received cervical cord injuries,
and from 1984 through 2004, ten received cerebral injuries from which they never
completely recovered").
232. See supranotes 2, 80-81 and accompanying text (describing the profits that the
NCAA and universities generate through the various intercollegiate athletics
programs).
233. See Northwestern Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, at *56 (Mar. 26, 2014)
(relating graduate assistants' duties to educational requirements).
234. See id. at *36 (finding that athletes at Northwestern do not receive any
academic credit for playing football and that none of the coaches are members of the
faculty).
235. See Marzan & Tillett-Saks, supra note 34, at 317 (arguing that the work college
athletes perform is akin to that of cafeteria workers-since it is devoid of an academic

1574

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1533

Accordingly, in comparison to a bargaining unit already afforded
employee status under the Act, college athletes provide a stronger case
for employee status under the first element of the right to control test
because the work they perform is substantially more demanding and
laborious and the compensation they receive is comparable to what student
assistants receive. Thus, the Board should have no qualm in finding that
college athletes work for their universities in return for compensation.
2. The second element: Universities control the details of college athletes'
work

College athletes participating in revenue-generating sports at
Division I universities meet the second element of the right to control
test 3 6 because, as the Regional Director's thorough examination of the
Northwestern football players' lives illustrates, universities exert
pervasive control over college athletes." 7 Scholarship on this matter
further demonstrates that Northwestern's control over its athletes is
typical of collegiate athletics nationally, where teams, universities,
athletic conferences, and athletic associations subject absolute control
over college athletes.2" Admittedly, the university's supervision of
athletic performance is understandable and to be expected, but
control over college athletes' personal lives off the field rises to an
incomparable level." 9 In fact, one would be hard-pressed to find a
character-who are indubitably employees of the university and work for
compensation).
236. See Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 15 n.100 (Aug. 23, 2016) (citing
Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (holding that the second
element of the right to control test is "[if] the statutory employer has the power or
right to control and direct the person in the material details of how such work is to be
performed"). Also, universities derive their control from "tender" agreements that
college athletes sign. See Marzin & Tillett-Saks, supra note 34.
237. See supra notes 85-89 (relating how officials at Northwestern controlled the
football players' athletic activities, their recreational and social autonomy, and even
their academics).
238. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 29, at 97-116 (describing in
excruciating detail the daily life of college athletes participating in football and men's
basketball at three different Division I universities and concluding that "employeeathletes are subject to more control by their universities than is any other employee or
group of employees at their institutions"); see, e.g., Nocera & Strauss, supra note 5;
Miller, supra note 29, at 1145, 1150. Additionally, the NCAA has significant control
over college athletes. See generally supra Section I.D.1 (describing the restrictions that
college athletes are placed under, including, but not limited to, receiving only, enough
scholarship compensation to cover tuition, housing, books, and food plans, and having
their daily schedules planned for them by the university).
239. On the field, coaches mandate "what positions the college athletes will play,
how they will play the game, how they will train for the game, and how they will stay in
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more illuminating example of a category of employees under the Act
where the employer has such a degree of control over the details of the
work the employees perform.24 o
College athletes' excessive control at the hands of the NCAA and
university officials is particularly evident in comparison to universities'
control over student assistants. In Columbia, the Board's twenty-two-page
opinion devoted a mere three sentences to the application of the second
element of the right to control test to student assistants. It stated:
Here, the University directs and oversees student assistants' teaching
activities. Indeed, the University possesses a significant interest in
maintaining such control, as the student assistants' work advances a
key business operation of the University:
the education of
undergraduate students. The record shows that teaching assistants
who do not adequately perform their duties to the University's
satisfaction are subject to corrective counseling or removal.
This succinct and slightly vapid analysis highlights the low threshold
for "control" that the test requires and how squarely college athletes fit
under this application. By comparison, universities do not exert
control over the personal and recreational lives of student assistants
outside of demanding their satisfactory completion of academic
responsibilities."' Although Columbia shows that.the details of Ph.D.

"

students' work is more closely controlled than the work of
undergraduate students, 4 1 the Board still held that all the petitioners
in the bargaining unit in Columbia were appropriate and therefore
employees under the Act.2
Consequently, Columbia set a benchmark for how much control an

employer needs to exert over an employee to satisfy the second
element of the right to control test. It only needs to match the control
that Columbia University exerted over undergraduate students-the
employees

in

the bargaining

unit with

the

least demanding

shape during the off-season." Marzdn & Tillett-Saks, supra note 34, at 311. Off the
field, the university controls the players' use of alcohol and drugs, use of social media
accounts, ability to garner additional income through outside employment, ability to
drive personal vehicles, and even autonomy to travel off campus. Id. The players'
itineraries often control their schedule from sunrise to sunset, during seasonal play
and off-season, and demands well over the traditional forty-hour week. Id.
240. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 29, at 97 n.123 ("What other university
employee is subject to such control by his supervisor that he must lift weights at
5:30 a.m., run in the summer sun, and seek permission to leave campus during
summertime off hours, or risk termination?").

241.

Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.RB. No. 90, at 15.

242.

Supra note 114 and accompanying text.

243.
244.

Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 19.
Id. at 2.

1576

AMERICAN UNIVERSTIY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1533

restrictions. The biggest element of control the university exerted over
undergraduate students in Columbia was removal for failure to
adequately perform required duties."' Universities similarly threaten
. college athletes with discharge for failing to perform athletic
responsibilities, but universities control athletes even more because
they can be removed for failing to adhere to a litany of expectations
imposed on them."' For example, a college athlete will forfeit his or
her amateur status-the catalyst for participation in collegiate sportsif he or she receives financial assistance from a sports organization,
enters into an agreement with an agent, or contracts to play
professional sports after college.24 7 This, coupled with the pervasive
control mentioned above that college athletes experience year-round
in all facets of their lives, indicate that if the Board asserts jurisdiction
over college athletes, it should have no difficulty recognizing them as
statutory employees under the right to control test.24 8
Applying Columbia'sJurisdictionalStandardto College Athletes
The Board asserts jurisdiction over cases when doing so would
C.

further the purposes and policies of the Act.2 4 9

The Act's history

demonstrates that Congress sought to establish collective bargaining
to avert workplace unrest, which may occur in the absence of a process
More importantly,
for employees to choose representation.
however, the Act sought to prevent the exploitation of labor by giving
workers the opportunity to bargain for their rights.25 1 It is the premise

of this Comment that extending the Act's protections to college
Therefore,
athletes would promote these policies of the Act.
Northwestern was incorrectly decided and is irreconcilable with the
Board's opinion in Columbia recognizing an employment relationship
between student assistants and universities.
245. Id. at 15.
246. See generally Bird, supra note 144 and accompanying text.
247. Id.
248. See Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 17 (" [W]here a university exerts the
[and where] specific work is performed as a condition of
requisite control ...
receiving the financial award," the worker should be properly treated as an employee
under the Act).
249. Id. at 13; see also supranote 123 and accompanying text (showing the avenues
the Board may pursue in exercising its discretion to decline jurisdiction).
250. Supranote 32 and accompanying text.
251. Supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Wagner's
remarks during the congressional debate of the Act, where the senator professed that
employees could only gain freedom and dignity through coordination and
cooperation with one another).
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The Columbia and Northwestern decisions each approached the
question of whether to assert jurisdiction from different vantage
points. Both began with the same question: whether asserting
jurisdiction furthers the purposes and policies of the Act. 52
Subsequently, however, the cases diverged. On the one hand,
Northwestern insisted on exploring whether asserting jurisdiction would
promote stability in "labor relations," which it heralded as the main
purpose of the Act and thus the ultimate harbinger of whether the
Board should assert jurisdiction.' On the other hand, Columbia did
not explicitly explore whether asserting jurisdiction over student
assistants would promote stability in labor relations,' but rather,
whether asserting jurisdiction would promote collective bargaining
and protect workers' freedoms to express a choice.'
Columbia's
jurisdictional standard should control because it is the most recent
precedent concerning discretion to assert jurisdiction in the private
university context and is thus more persuasive than Northwestern.
1. Northwestern's jurisdictionalanalysis is not controllingand is
unpersuasive

The Board in Northwestern concluded that asserting jurisdiction over
college athletes would not promote the Act's policy to promote
stability in labor relations." For that conclusion, the Board relied on
two considerations: (1) the nature of collegiate sports leagues and (2)

252. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 6-7; Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B.
No. 167, at 3 (Aug. 17, 2015).
253. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 3 ("[I]t would not effectuate the
policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction. Our decision is primarily premised on a
finding that . .. it Would not promote stability in labor relations to assert jurisdiction
in this case.").
254. Notably, the legal analysis of whether asserting jurisdiction would promote
stability in "labor relations" does not appear in Columbia's twenty-two-page opinion
once; whereas, in Northwestern's seven-page opinion, "labor relations" in such a context
is invoked at least ten times. See generally Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 1;
Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 1, 3, 5, 6.
255. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 6-7. It is significant-although
puzzling-that the Columbia Board pivoted away from its jurisdictional discretion
analysis in Northwestern because the decisions were issued within a year of one another
and the composition of the Board was identical in both opinions. See NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, Members of the NLRB Since 1935, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board/members-nrb-1935 (last visited Aug. 30, 2017). The only exceptions are
that Member Miscimarra dissented in Columbia and Member Johnson held the
Madden seat in Columbia. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 22-34 (Miscimarra,
Member, dissenting).
256. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 3.
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of FBS football. 5

The first

consideration refers to the "control" that is exercised by the league
over individual teams, while the second consideration refers to the fact
that the majority of competitors in the NCAA are public universities or
colleges beyond the Board's jurisdiction."'
Under the first consideration, the Board reasoned that because
organizing football games required cooperation, universities
collaborated to create the NCAA and subsequently relinquished a
substantial degree of control to the NCAA."' As a result of this necessary
arrangement, labor issues directly involving only an individual team would
also affect the NCAA and other member institutions.2" This is problematic
in the Board's view because single-team bargaining units would disrupt
uniformity and stability in labor relations."'
Regarding the second consideration, the Board reasoned that
asserting jurisdiction would not promote labor relations because the
composition and structure of FBS football is mostly public, meaning
the Board's decisions would not reach most teams within the NCAA or
To assertjurisdiction would thus create an
the Big Ten Conference.
"inherent asymmetry" of labor relations regulatory regimes within the
same conference because state labor law would govern public
3
universities and federal labor law would govern private universities.2
The Board's first consideration in Northwestern speaks to its concern
about the dilution of the NCAA and member institutions' power vis-avis college athletes. What the Board characterized as a lack of
257. Id.
258. Id. Northwestern is the only private school in the NCAA's Big Ten division,
and one of seventeen private universities nationwide out of over 125 schools in the
Id. at 2; see also About the Conference, BIG TEN,
NCAA's Division I FBS.

http://www.bigten.org/school-bio/bigl0-school-bio.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2017)
(describing the "Big Ten Conference" as one of "intercollegiate sports' most successful
undertakings" and listing the fourteen schools in the Big Ten); Times Editorial Board,

Why

Can't College Athletes Unionize?, L.A. TIMEs (Aug. 26, 2015,

5:00 AM),

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-ncaa-20150826-story.html.
Additionally, five of the schools in the Big Ten Conference are in right-to-work states, and two
others are in states that passed laws declaring that college athletes are not employees. Id.

259.

Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 4 (finding that the NCAA now

enjoys a substantial degree of control over the operations of athletic programs of
member teams and the conditions in which college athletes practice and compete).

260. Id.
261. Id. at 4-5.
262. Id. at 5; see also NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, jurisdictionalStandards,
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/jurisdictional-standards (last visited Aug. 30,
2016) (explaining that the Board has jurisdiction over private sector employers whose
activity in interstate commerce meets the minimum standard).

263.

Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 5.
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"stability" in labor relations, however, is essentially a euphemism for a
world in which collective bargaining on college campuses tips the
scales of bargaining power and results in the NCAA and member
institutions having diminished control over college athletes.2 " Indeed,
effective integration of collective bargaining must require some initial
instability in labor relations to change the dynamics of the employeeemployer relationship." Moreover, Northwestern fails to consider that
there is ample evidence suggesting that the Act was intended to dojust
that: bring workers under the fold of the Act's protections to prevent
exploitation and promote equity in bargaining power.
The Board's second consideration in Northwestern can be boiled
down to one basic premise: that the arrangement of college football
is too complex for the Act's model of collective bargaining'6
This
premise is not only insidious,2' but also unpersuasive because it flies
in the face of empirical evidence showing the resilience of collective
bargaining in several different sectors that are as complex and
hierarchical as NCAA football.2 " The Board in Columbia admonished
the Brown Board for failing to consider empirical evidence showing the
effective integration of collective bargaining in the public university
context, the national security sector, and the acute care hospital
sector. 270 Northwestern similarly fails to consider collective bargaining's
"historic flexibility" as a practice, choosing instead to focus on

264. Id. at 4-5 (detailing the Board's decision not to assert jurisdiction because it
would not promote "stability" in labor relations, but denying student-athletes the
opportunity to collectively bargain and suggesting that the broader implication would
diminish the power of the NCAA and member institutions).
265. See Marzin & Tillett-Saks, supranote 34, at 332 (noting that the Congressional

&

intent of the Act was to create a significant change in labor relations by "compelling
employers to bargain with employees" through the use of collective bargaining and
other similar techniques).
266. Supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (contextualizing the advent of
federal labor as a result of the judiciary's unsuccessful attempts in the past to regulate
labor disputes and Congress's desire to check the judiciary's suppression of organized
labor activities).
267. Marzan & Tillett-Saks, supra note 34, at 342.
268. However sincere the Board's rationale is, it is evidence of a historical
anachronism where courts treat sports law with "kid gloves." See McCormick
McCormick, supra note 2, at 497 (identifying three areas of law-labor, antitrust, and
taxation-where the myth of amateurism shields the NCAA from regulation and are
examples of how amateurism provides "unwarranted and improper exemption from
the law at the expense of the athletes, the public, and justice itself").
269. Supra note 135 and accompanying text.
270. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 7-8, 11-12 (Aug. 23, 2016).
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conjectural claims of harm to the NCAA as a result of private
universities instituting collective bargaining. 71
Even if the Board is persuasive in finding that the structure of college
football is unique, the Board's rationale makes a flawed assumption. It
assumes that implementing collective bargaining in the private
university context would create an "inherent asymmetry" of labor
relations regulatory regimes within the same conference because the
status quo will not change as state governments refuse to recognize
college athletes as employees. 72 However, this ignores reality. Some
governments have moved toward recognizing college athletes as
employees, 7 as have state and federal courts. 7 More importantly, the
Board's assumption is even more apparent when viewed in light of the
national zeitgeist: where increased scrutiny to the commercialization
of collegiate sports at the expense of college athletes has increased to
The Board should recognize that asserting
a breaking point. 7'
jurisdiction would not only promote the Act's purposes, but it would
also encourage state governments to follow suit.
To be sure, Northwestern's concern about instability in labor relations
has some merit. 276

However, that concern does not arise from the

policies of the Act nor does it constitute "compelling reasons" for the
Board to exclude a category of workers that meet the Board's statutory
test for recognition as employees under the Act.277 Moreover, even if

Northwestern identified realistic concerns about instability in labor
relations, those concerns must be more pressing than those present in
allowing student assistants to bargain collectively. Accordingly, the
Board'sjurisdictional discretion analysis in Northwestern is unpersuasive
and should be afforded as little deference as the Columbia Board
applied in overruling the Brown decision.
271. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 4 (Aug. 17, 2015) (finding
that the NCAA's "degree of control" would be threatened if individual teams were able
to collectively bargain).
272. Id. at 5.
273. In 2015, the Connecticut State Legislature proposed a bill that would designate
college athletes in revenue-generating sports in public universities as employees with
collective bargaining rights. H.B. 5485,Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015).
274. Supra note 71.
275. Supra Section II.D.2 (discussing some major lawsuits against the NCAA as of
2014 contesting NCAA policies governing college athletes' scholarship amounts,
health, pay, and the continued role amateurism plays in college sports).
276. Hyman, supra note 90 (arguing that the Board's decision in Columbia has
"upended -decades of precedent" and has led to deleterious effects, such as the
invalidation of rules barring profanity, which promote civility).
277. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 5 (Aug. 23, 2016).
278. Id. at 1, 4.
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2. Columbia's jurisdictionalstandardrequires the Board to assert
jurisdiction over college athletes
The Board in Columbia considered two factors in creating a standard
for asserting jurisdiction. First, Columbia makes clear that no matter
the reason for declining jurisdiction, the Board's reasons must be
grounded in promoting the policies and purposes of the Act." 9 Thus,
in the case of college athletes, the Act's main purpose that encourages
the practice of collective bargaining and protects workers' choice for
or against collective bargaining representation must be the first factor
the Board uses in determining whether to decline jurisdiction."'o
The Board made that abundantly clear when it admonished the
Brown opinion for relying on what it perceived was a "fundamental
tenet" of the Act: whether an economic relationship existed. 8 1 In fact,
the Board noted that the policy concern justifying excluding student
assistants from statutory coverage was "neither derived from the
statutory text .. . nor from the fundamental policy of the Act.""' The
Board concluded that it could "discern no such policies" and rejected
Brown's focus on whether student assistants have a "primarily
educational" employment relationship with their university."'
In the case of college athletes, asserting jurisdiction would certainly
promote the policies and purposes of the Act. The Act was intended as
a vehicle for economic and social progress, to promote collective bargaining,
and to shield workers from exploitation by employers." College athletes
in today's world do not have the right to profit off of their images,
likenesses, or names;28 5 are subjected to prohibitive control at the

279.

Supra note 123 and accompanying text.

280. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (explaining the historical
purpose of the Act).

281. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 3.
282. Id. at 3, 5. Although the Board in Brown did specifically conclude that student
assistants were not employees, the Columbia Board found that declining statutory
coverage must be premised on either the statute or the fundamental policy of the Act.
Id. at 5-6. This suggests that a decision to decline jurisdiction should either be
premised on the statutory exclusions or, alternatively, for reasons that would not
promote the policies of the Act.
283. Id. at 6. Similarly, the Board should reject Northwestern'sjurisdictional analysis
proclaiming stability in labor relations as the purpose of the Act because it is a "vague
notion of a statute's 'basic purpose"' not derived from the statute or its policies. Id.

(quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993)).
284. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 6-7; supra notes 32-37 and
accompanying text (explaining the historical purpose of the Act).
285. Supra note 169 and accompanying text.

1582

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1533

"

hands of their universities and conferences; 286 and are at risk for
serious bodily injury in the course of their work.28 ' Because they have
the most to gain from the Act's protections, college athletes are thus
uniquely suited for collective bargaining rights. This suggests that
collective bargaining would have a certain permanency on college campuses
because college athletes would seriously value their bargaining rights.
Consequently, asserting jurisdiction over college athletes would encourage
the vitality of the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
In addition to promoting the policies and purposes of the Act, the
second factor that the Columbia Board considered in determining
whether to decline jurisdiction over a particular bargaining unit is
whether the Act is capable of managing labor disputes in that
context." The Board in Columbia found that collective bargaining's
"historic flexibility" as a practice and pugnacity in successfully
navigating delicate topics that arise during collective bargaining
suggest that student assistants and their purported employers-the
private universities-could rely on the Act to manage conflict. 8 ' For
instance, the Board noted the tools available to universities to ensure
collective bargaining would not be harmful to the educational context
and pointed out several sectors where the Act's resilience has allowed
collective bargaining to succeed.2
All of these considerations apply with equal force to college athletes.
The NCAA and member institutions will retain the same tools the
Board identified as sufficient for universities to use in bargaining with
school assistants. Although collegiate sports are generally centralized
and hierarchical," they are nevertheless not so different from labor
sectors in which bargaining has thrived sufficiently enough to justify
exclusion. More importantly, collective bargaining has already proven
to work on public university campuses, where collective bargaining is
"increasingly a fact of American university life."1 2 All in all, collective
bargaining is not a magic wand that college athletes will waive when
286. Supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text (describing the control that
universities have over college athletes' living, working, and recreational activities).
287. Supranote 163 (citing a lawsuit against the NCAA in 2011 that details the high
incidence of concussions and other athletic injuries among college athletes and alleges
that the NCAA's inaction increased the risk of long-term injury and illness); supra note
231 and accompanying text (citing to examples of athletes who suffered severe injuries
and even death directly resulting from playing or practicing football).
288. Supra note 126 and accompanying text.
289. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.RB. No. 90, at 9.
290. Supra note 135 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Section II.D.1 (examining the organization and nature of the NCAA).
292. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 9.
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feeling aggrieved or overworked; rather, it is a regimented process with
a mandatory scope of bargaining that is more appropriate for
managing labor disputes in the private university context than the
status quo." Therefore, Columbia'sjurisdictional standard is not only
controlling as the most recent Board precedent, but it also provides a
persuasive justification for asserting jurisdiction that is grounded on
the Act's historical purposes and ability to solve labor disputes.
CONCLUSION

Although Columbia University has yet to determine whether it will
appeal the Board's decision in federal court, there is some evidence
that the university is dragging its feet following a recent graduate
student vote." Columbia University did issue a statement asserting
that it disagrees with the Board's conclusion in Columbia that found
that student assistants are employees under the Act." This statement
demonstrates that affording student assistants or athletes the
designation of "employee" under the Act is still controversial.
The Board has admittedly never before extended the Act's
protections to college athletes, but the Board's opinion in Columbia
leaves little room to doubt that college athletes participating in
revenue-generating sports at NCAA Division I colleges and universities
are employees under the Act. First, the Board's statutory analysis
suggests that the lack of statutory exclusions for "students" and

293. See id. at 12 (noting that the more a worker engages in "fervent[] lobbying" for better
representation, the more the action suggests that the current model of labor relations is
unresponsive to those workers' needs and that collective bargaining may be appropriate).

294.

See Columbia Delays Again; Meeting Next Thursday, GWC-UAW Local 2110: A

Union for Research & Teaching Assistants at Columbia Univ. (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://columbiagradunion.org/2017/03/20/columbia-delays-again-meeting-nextthursday (describing the December vote in favor of unionization won by an
"overwhelming" margin); Colleen Flaherty, 'Running Out the Clock' on Grad Unions?,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 4, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2017/05/04/graduate-student-union-bids-private-institutions-have-succeededflopped-and-been (citing the 1602 to 623 graduate student vote in support of
unionization and Columbia's appeal of the election, claiming that there were
irregularities and inconsistencies at polling sites); Tyler Larkworthy, Columbia
University Begins Legal Battle to Prevent Graduate Student Union, DAILY PENNSYLvANIAN

(Mar.

31, 2017,

4:20 PM),

http://www.thedp.com/article/2017/03/columbia-

graduate-students-unionize-administration-opposes (asserting that the objection filed
by Columbia begins a legal battle that could last for years).
295. Richard Gonzales, NLRB Rules GraduateStudents Are Employees with the Right to
Unionize, NPR (Aug. 23, 2016, 4:37 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/08/23/491090762/nlrb-rules-graduate-students-are-employees-with-theright-to-unionize.
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"universities," as well as the Board's precedent in broadly interpreting
the definition of "employee," plainly bring college athletes under the
folds of the Act." Next, the Board's common law right to control test
supports bringing college athletes under statutory coverage because
college athletes work in exchange for compensation and universities
control the details and manner of their work." Lastly, the Board's
jurisdictional discretion standard undeniably supports the notion that
in asserting jurisdiction over college athletes, the Board would
promote the practice of collective bargaining and support athletes'
freedom of choice in representation-the actual purposes of the Act.9"

The Board has the authority to assert jurisdiction over college
athletes, as is evident from its tumultuous history overturning former
decisions.' In light of Columbia, to decline jurisdiction where a
category of workers are entitled-under the Board's statutory test for
determining who is an employee-to recognition as employees
requires compelling policy justifications.oo Although the Board in
Columbia did not expand on what constitutes compelling justifications,
those justifications cannot be found in the structure of the NCAA or in
the Board's limitedjurisdiction extending only over private universities."o
Moreover, in contrast to the pontificated policy reasons for
declining jurisdiction in the case of college athletes, there stands a
national movement scrutinizing the NCAA and universities'
commercialization and exploitation of college athletes. Within the last
five years, the courts, the Board, and public opinion have criticized the
NCAA for its exorbitant profits on the backs of college athletes; its
negligent procedures failing to provide for athletes' welfare; and its
prohibitive control of college athletes' athletic, social, and academic
lives."o 2 It is apparent that the status quo as concerns college athletes
is changing. The Board should take this opportunity to use the Act as
it was intended-a vehicle for social and economic change" 3-and
oversee the effective integration of collective bargaining for college
athletes in the private university context, recognizing that college
athletes in revenue-generating sports at NCAA Division I colleges and
universities are statutory employees under the Act.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Supra Section IIIA.
Supra Section III.B.
Supra Section III.C.2.
Supra Section II.B.1.
Supra Section II.C.3.
Supra Section III.C.1.
Supra Sections II.D.2 (a)-(c).
Supra Section II.A.

